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1 
Introduction 
This dissertation is composed of three independent research articles focusing on the 
importance of geographical concentrations along various dimensions in regional economics. More 
specifically, the thesis deals with topics regarding agglomeration spillovers, firm performance, 
culture and soft institutions as well as the geographical concentration of political ideologies. The aim 
of this work is to provide empirical evidence of the importance of spatial proximity in different 
contexts. In particular, the purpose of this thesis is threefold: 1) to analyze the effects of spatial 
concentrations of firms on their ability to access to credit; 2) to examine whether language barriers 
influence the geographical extension of different types of agglomeration spillovers; and 3) to 
empirically identify whether there is any spatial concentration of political ideologies and verify 
whether this concentration is correlated with income and income inequality. 
In the last decades, there has been an increasing attention from various actors in the society to 
the topic of economic globalization, defined as the growing openness of local and national economies, 
which integrate into a single world economy (Iammarino and McCann, 2013; Pike et al., 2017). 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the acceleration of this process, combined with the beginning of 
the Digital Age (Castells, 1996), contributed to the rise of views in which geographical distances are 
no longer important. Indeed, some have claimed that the world was becoming “flat”, in the sense that 
the emergence of a global network, in which all economic actors operate, drastically reduces (and 
maybe eliminates) the need and the benefits of spatial proximity (O’Brien, 1992; Friedman, 2005). 
In contrast with this view, as highlighted by Pike et al. (2017), in the last decades there has 
been an increase in the urbanization process, in which people and economic activities are more and 
more concentrated in cities. Hence, globalization, rather than making the world more “flat”, is in 
reality making it more “spiky” (Florida, 2005; Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008) and “curved” 
(McCann, 2008). Indeed, as highlighted by McCann (2018), the evolution of globalization processes 
over the last centuries clearly shows that geographical distance has become today even more 
important than in the past. In particular, the first era of globalization, which started in the seventeenth 
century and lasted until the middle of the twentieth century, was characterized by trade relationships 
occurring over large distances with neighboring countries trading different types of goods. This is a 
characteristic feature of international trade during the European colonial period. However, modern 
globalization, which started in the middle of the twentieth century, is mainly characterized by trade 
relationships between neighboring countries with similar economic profiles and trading similar 
goods. Modern globalization is not based on competing on the cost of inputs, but is based on adding 
value into the production process, which depends on knowledge exchange, especially through face-
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to-face interactions. As the importance of knowledge increases, so does the need for concentration, 
which highlights the importance of cities in this modern globalization process. This has led to the 
term “global regionalism” (Iammarino and McCann, 2013), describing groups of neighboring 
countries which are more and more integrated on various economic dimensions. Hence, as underlined 
by Iammarino and McCann (2013), geographical proximity has become even more important in 
processes of knowledge spillovers and agglomeration externalities. In particular, the role of global 
cities is nowadays particularly relevant because of their ability to concentrate economic activities, 
attract financial and human capital as well as facilitate innovation processes (Pike et al., 2017). The 
underlying reason is that there are productivity gains due to clustering, proximity and economies of 
scale. At the sub-national level, a consequence of these processes is an increase in inter-regional 
divergence (Brackman and van Marrenwijk, 2008). All these changes demonstrate and support the 
arguments which were already formalized from a theoretical perspective in the “new economic 
geography” literature, which relies on the concept of economies of scale at the national level, the 
regional level (cities), and the firm level (Krugman, 1991). 
Nevertheless, although there is an increasing number of studies demonstrating the importance 
of geographical proximity in international trade and economic geography, various actors in the 
society argue that this is no longer true and that the world is in a “post-geography trading phase” 
(Financial Times, 2016), supporting claims such as the “end of geography”, the “death of distance”, 
or the “world is flat” (McCann, 2008). Political narratives built on these arguments, even if incorrect, 
might have significant consequences. Indeed, as highlighted by McCann (2018), the results of the 
Brexit referendum represent a key example, in which these claims have been used to justify the 
easiness with which the UK economy could replace the trade relationships with the European Union 
with new and deeper trade relationships with countries farther away. Similar arguments are also 
supported by various politicians and actors in the Swiss society aiming at cancelling the bilateral 
agreements between Switzerland and the European Union. The increasing evidence from economic 
geography clearly contradicts these narratives, but seems to suffer from problems of persuasion, 
making it difficult to build serious debates within a society, because often based on arguments 
unrelated to empirical reality (McCann, 2018).  
The purpose of this thesis is to enrich the current discussion on the relevance of spatial 
proximity by proposing empirical analyses demonstrating that distance still represents an obstacle for 
various processes in regional economics. The contribution of this work is to demonstrate for the first 
time the importance of geographical proximity in unexplored dimensions of regional economics. 
More specifically, the first study aims at empirically verifying whether agglomeration spillovers 
affect a particular indicator of firm performance, namely firm solvency, which, in turn, determines 
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firms’ ability to borrow. In the second research, the goal is to examine empirically whether the spatial 
scale of the different types of agglomeration spillovers shape and/or are shaped by cultural and soft 
institutional discontinuities, as reflected by linguistic differences between localities. Finally, the third 
analysis proposes a new definition of spatial cohesion, based on the geographical concentration of 
political ideologies, and aims at empirically identifying whether there is any spatial concentration of 
political ideologies and verify whether these concentrations are correlated with income and income 
inequality. 
These three chapters, in particular the first two studies, link to the endogenous growth theory 
(Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Krugman, 1991; Rebelo, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; based on the 
works of Arrow, 1962; Uzawa, 1965; Sidrauski, 1967), stating that positive externalities and 
knowledge spillover effects have an important influence on economic development. In particular, 
knowledge spillovers and externalities are among the key drivers supporting the agglomeration of 
firms. Within this context, cluster theories state that the geographical concentration of economic 
activities generates different cost-saving benefits and productivity advantages which are external to 
firms. Marshall (1920) first described clusters as a “concentration of specialized industries in 
particular localities”. 
Hence, according to economic theory, the economic performance of regions and firms is 
enhanced by the existence of agglomeration economies in the regions (McCann, 2001). In addition, 
economists have identified different kinds of agglomeration economies. The three main typologies of 
agglomeration externalities which have been investigated by researchers are localization economies, 
urbanization spillovers and competition externalities. 
Localization (also known as specialization or MAR) economies (Marshall, 1920; Arrow, 
1962; Romer, 1986) arise from the geographical concentration of businesses belonging to the same 
industry, allowing communication and cooperation processes. Within this framework, firms benefit 
from the concentration of other businesses belonging to the same industry because of three main 
reasons: larger pools of skilled labor in the surrounding area, more specialized suppliers and 
knowledge inflows from competitors. 
Specialization economies are external to firms but internal to industry. On the contrary, 
urbanization (or Jacobs) externalities (Jacobs, 1969), as specified in Hoover (1937, 1948), are external 
to firms, while internal to urban concentration. The main idea behind this kind of agglomeration 
economies is that the diversity of spatially concentrated industries promotes the cross pollination of 
ideas across industries. Thus, while specialization economies arise from the geographical 
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concentration of firms belonging to the same industry, urbanization economies derive from the spatial 
concentration of businesses belonging to different industries. 
Competition (or Porter) externalities (Porter, 1990) arise from the spatial concentration of 
firms competing in the same market. Hence, like specialization economies, competition externalities 
take the form of intra-industry transmission of knowledge spillovers, however, they derive from the 
regional competition within industries, as in the case of Jacobs externalities. 
Taking into account this strand of the literature, the first chapter of this thesis empirically tests 
whether various typologies of agglomeration spillovers impact a particular indicator of firm 
performance, namely firm solvency. This indicator is not self-reported by firms (as it is often the case 
with other indicators used in the literature), rather it is computed from an external and standardized 
perspective and it is used by financial markets in order to reduce the asymmetries in information 
characterizing them (Bernanke et al., 1999). Therefore, this measure is important in determining 
firms’ ability to borrow. The underlying research question of this study is the following: do 
agglomeration spillovers impact on firm solvency? The analysis focuses on whether employment 
specialization and diversity patterns influence firm solvency. 
The empirical results of this study imply that agglomeration mechanisms shape firm’s credit 
accessibility, along with the characteristics of the firm itself and geographical information. As 
highlighted by the economic literature, this has in turn implications on firm’s investment possibility 
and therefore on their ability to strengthen their productivity. This study finds that firms located in 
Ticino benefit from the municipal concentration of firms within the same industry, while urbanization 
externalities, at both municipal and cantonal levels, seem to generate congestion diseconomies, 
having a predicted negative impact on firm solvency.  
The second study of this thesis combines the stream of literature on agglomeration economies 
with a growing body of literature highlighting that culture, “soft” or informal institutions and 
economy are interrelated (Beugelsdijk and Maseland, 2011; De Jong, 2009), and, in particular, that 
culture and informal or soft institutions heavily shape and are shaped by economic geography (Pike 
et al., 2011; Storper, 2013). More specifically, the aim of this chapter is to examine whether there is 
any detailed empirical evidence that a particular dimension of culture, namely language, does indeed 
influence economic geography, in a context where neither ethnic diversity nor poor institutional 
quality are key features. 
In order to do so, this analysis examines whether language borders influence the geographical 
extension of different types of agglomeration spillovers. In particular, this research examines 
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empirically how local employment patterns are related to linguistic differences between localities. 
The analysis focuses on Switzerland, which represents an appropriate case-study for examining these 
types of cultural differences, because in the specific case of Switzerland linguistic differences have 
indeed been argued to be the key marker of cultural differences (Hofstede, 2001). In this context, this 
study tracks how employment patterns in one locality are related to those in neighboring localities, 
and examines whether these relationships differ across linguistic borders in a manner which is distinct 
from simply different locality administrative borders. In particular, the analysis examines whether 
employment specialization or diversity patterns differ across different types of borders, after 
controlling for geographical, economic and topographical features.  
The results of this study demonstrate that, in the context of Switzerland, linguistic differences 
shape the economic geography of agglomeration mechanisms. These findings imply that the spatial 
scale of the different types of agglomeration spillovers are indeed mediated and altered by linguistic 
discontinuities. More specifically, according to the results, specialization externalities are enhanced 
when firms are located close to municipalities with the same language, whereas competition and 
diversity externalities are reinforced when firms are located close to municipalities with different 
languages. Exactly why these particular empirical results emerge is a different question and is left for 
future research. It is possible that linguistic discontinuities may represent an obstacle to the 
geographical extension of specialization externalities. As seen above, localization economies tend to 
arise from the direct interaction among firms operating in the same sector and in the same area, and 
therefore on the basis of these results it seems reasonable to infer that linguistic differences may 
introduce an obstacle to direct knowledge-interactions among firms operating in broadly the same 
field. On the other hand, the results suggest that linguistic differences may encourage knowledge 
interactions between firms operating in different fields, in a manner reflecting the arguments of Jacobs 
(1969), although, at this stage these explanations can only be tentative and speculative and require 
much more deliberation. 
The third chapter of this thesis analyses geographical concentrations and the relevance of 
spatial proximity from a different perspective. More specifically, the aim is to propose a new 
definition of spatial cohesion, representing a new way to capture social interactions, based on the 
geographical concentration of political ideologies. The research links to the literature on geographical 
sorting, stating that people with similar income levels cluster together due to similar constraint in the 
residential decision (Fujita, 1989, based on the pioneering work of von Thünen, 1826 and Alonso, 
1964) and because of individual preferences to live close to people with similar socio-economic 
characteristics (Tiebout, 1956). At the same time, the political science literature is increasingly 
interested in the phenomenon of partisan sorting, which analyzes whether individuals with similar 
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political preferences are nowadays more geographically clustered (Bishop, 2008; Abramowitz, 2010; 
Abrams and Fiorina, 2012; Tam Cho et al., 2013). Additionally, according to the literature on voting 
behavior, people sorting themselves based on socio-economic characteristics are also expected to 
share similar political ideologies. The implication is that income-sorting processes and partisan-
sorting forces are likely to be interrelated phenomena, leading to the clustering of people having 
similar levels of income and political ideologies. 
The aim of this research is to empirically identify whether there is any spatial concentration 
of political ideologies in the context of Switzerland and determine the spatial extension of these 
concentrations. Moreover, this study analyzes whether this clustering of political preferences is 
correlated with income and income inequality. The analysis focuses on Switzerland, which represents 
a very interesting case because it practices a semi-direct democracy, which allows having a rich 
dataset on many referenda, which is independent from short-term, candidate-related and party-related 
factors. The benefit of using data related to referenda is that they are the direct observed outcome of 
underlying unobserved political ideologies. 
Following Hermann and Leuthold (2003), this research analyzes the results of 312 federal 
referenda between 1981 and 2017 at the municipal level. This study identifies Hermann and Leuthold 
(2003)’s three dimensions representing the Swiss political ideology space and expressing the 
following political beliefs: left vs. right, liberal vs. conservative and ecological vs. technocratic. 
Additionally, on each of these three dimensions, this analysis empirically assesses the existence of 
spatial concentrations of Swiss municipalities sharing the same political ideology. This result is 
particularly interesting because it shows that the various sorting processes leading to the concentration 
of people sharing similar political preferences extend beyond municipal borders. Finally, based on 
these results, this research finds significant differences in the level of income and income inequality 
of Swiss municipalities, depending on their belonging to a political ideology cluster. This result 
contributes and further supports the findings and claims of other scholars, related to the concept of 
“the geography of discontent”, referring to the spatial distribution of discontent in a country, 
reflecting inequalities between regions in terms of economic welfare (Los et al., 2017; Rodríguez-
Pose, 2017; McCann, 2018) and according to which economic geography is particularly important in 
understanding how people vote. 
In general, the results of the analyses contained in this thesis contribute to the current 
discussion on the importance of geographical proximity, by empirically demonstrating that distance 
still represents an obstacle for various processes in economics, against the view that the world has 
become “flat”. These results further support the findings and claims of other scholars, arguing that, 
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along with the rise of globalization processes, distance has become even more important. More 
specifically, the findings of this thesis shed light on unexplored aspects of agglomeration processes 
and demonstrate the importance of geographical proximity in the cases of firm’s credit accessibility, 
the interaction between culture and agglomeration externalities, and the interaction between political 
ideologies and economic welfare. These findings are particularly interesting because they emerge 
from the Swiss context, a small open economy in which globalization processes have always had 
great impacts and where distances are notably small.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: the next chapter is dedicated to the analysis on 
the effects of spatial concentrations of firms on their ability to access to credit. The second chapter 
examines whether linguistic differences influence the geographical extension of different types of 
agglomeration spillovers, while the third chapter empirically identifies whether there is any spatial 
concentration of political ideologies and verifies whether this concentration is correlated with welfare. 
Finally, a conclusion paragraph draws results and conclusions of the dissertation. 
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1. Chapter 1: Agglomeration matters for firm solvency12 
Daniele Mantegazzi 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Recent empirical findings show a negative relationship between credit constraints and firm 
performance, due to asymmetries in information in the financial sector. Moreover, economic theory 
predicts a positive impact of agglomeration mechanisms on firm performance, generally identified 
with self-reported information. This paper examines whether agglomeration externalities affect firm 
solvency, a standardized indicator of firm performance, which helps decreasing asymmetries in 
information in financial markets and therefore determines firm’s ability to borrow. Moreover, this 
study overcomes problems of aggregation bias by applying spatial multilevel techniques. The results 
provide empirical evidence that agglomeration mechanisms shape in different ways firm’s credit 
accessibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: C21, O18, R1 
Keywords: Agglomeration economies, firm performance, firm solvency, aggregation bias, 
spatial multilevel analysis. 
 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on Mantegazzi (2016), Agglomeration matters for firm solvency. Presented at the 56th ERSA 
Congress, Vienna. Submitted to an international journal. 
2 The author would like to show his gratitude to Prof. Rico Maggi, Prof. Philip McCann, Prof. Levente Littvay and Dr. 
Viktor Venhorst who provided valuable insight and expertise. The author would also like to thank Dr. Valentina Mini 
for her comments and assistance on an earlier version of this study. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Economic theory highlights a positive relationship between firms’ credit accessibility and firm 
performance. Firms’ ability to obtain credits from banks and financial institutions affects their 
investment decisions and possibilities (Chen and Guariglia, 2013). Another important body of the 
economic literature underlines how the economic performance of firms, typically measured with firm 
productivity or employment growth, is enhanced by the existence of agglomeration economies in the 
region (McCann, 2001). 
The aim of this paper is to link these research streams. In particular, the goal is to empirically 
study how different typologies of agglomeration economies affect a particular indicator of firm 
performance, namely firm solvency. This standardized measure determines firms’ ability to borrow. 
The analysis focuses on whether employment specialization and diversity patterns influence firm 
solvency. The approach used is not meant to assess or support any mechanism underlying such 
relationship, it is rather the most direct method of empirically identifying the existence of such 
relationship. 
In addition, this paper contributes to the literature by overcoming problems of aggregation 
bias in the analysis of agglomeration economies. Empirical studies show ambiguous results in 
assessing whether and how agglomeration produces positive, null or negative effects in terms of 
economic performance (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009; De Groot et 
al., 2015). Recent overviews (Van Oort et al., 2012; De Groot et al., 2015) point out that this 
ambiguity emerges because traditional analyses are applied either on aggregated data or firm-level 
data, without simultaneously accounting for the heterogeneity at both levels, creating problems of 
aggregation bias. This paper overcomes problems of aggregation bias by simultaneously analyzing 
firm- and regional-level data and applying spatial multilevel techniques.  
The study applies this approach to a dataset combining firm- and municipal-level information 
from the Swiss canton Ticino. The findings highlight that less than 10% of the variance of firm 
performance is at the aggregated level. This underlines the importance of using firm-level data and 
implies that studies considering only aggregated data miss more than 90% of the information, likely 
generating the ambiguity that characterizes the literature. At the same time, researchers also need to 
account for the heterogeneity across municipalities. The results suggest that specialization 
externalities positively influence firm solvency, while urbanization externalities have a predicted 
negative impact on it. Finally, this analysis indicates that including an appropriate specification of 
spatial interaction allows better representing reality. 
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The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents a review of the related literature. 
The third section describes the model and the fourth section presents the database adopted for this 
research. Section five presents the results and the last section concludes. 
1.2 Literature review 
According to the economic literature, financial markets are particularly important in 
enhancing economic growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Following Shumpeter’s (1991) hypothesis, 
the financial sector reallocates capital to the highest value use, financing investments which 
strengthen productivity. Yet, theoretical models studying the financial sector assume asymmetries in 
information and other credit market frictions (Bernanke et al., 1999). Hence, financial market 
decisions rely on limited information and firms might encounter obstacles in obtaining external 
credits. Indeed, a recent empirical analysis shows a negative relationship between credit constraints 
and firm productivity (Ganau, 2016). 
Another important branch of economic theory states that the geographical concentration of 
economic activities generates different cost-saving benefits and productivity advantages which are 
external to firms and positively impacts their performance (McCann, 2001). The two main typologies 
of such spillover effects which have been investigated by researchers are specialization (or MAR) 
economies (Marshall, 1920; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986) and urbanization (or Jacobs) externalities 
(Jacobs, 1969). The main conclusion is that different typologies of agglomeration economies are 
hypothesized to boost regional growth in different ways. Moreover, traditional analyses on 
agglomeration externalities focus on their effects on the economic performance of firms, which is 
generally measured as employment level, employment growth or productivity (for an overview see 
Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009). 
The contribution of this research is to combine these two streams of the economic literature 
by empirically testing whether various typologies of agglomeration spillovers and mechanisms 
impact a particular indicator of firm performance, namely firm solvency. As better explained in 
section 1.4, this indicator is not self-reported by firms (as it is often the case with other indicators 
used in the literature), rather it is computed from an external and standardized perspective and it is 
used by financial markets in order to reduce the above-mentioned asymmetries in information. 
Therefore, this measure is important in determining firms ability to borrow. The underlying research 
question of this study is the following: do agglomeration spillovers impact on firm solvency? As seen 
above, firms with a higher performance are expected to have a higher accessibility to credits and 
agglomeration spillovers positively affect the economic performance of firms. Hence, the following 
hypothesis is specified:  
16 
Hypothesis 1: firms located close to other business activities are expected to have a higher 
solvency, allowing them to have a better access to credit. 
This paper also contributes to the literature from a technical perspective. In contrast with the 
theory, the empirical literature on agglomeration mechanisms is still debating to what extent these 
effects shape or are shaped by economic geography. Consequently, the empirical results are rather 
ambiguous in assessing whether and how agglomeration produces positive, null or negative effects 
(Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009; De Groot et al., 2015). Recent 
overviews (Van Oort et al., 2012; De Groot et al., 2015) indicate that this ambiguity may be due to a 
lack of research into the relationship between agglomeration externalities and individual firm 
performance. Traditional analyses are applied either on aggregated data or firm-level data, without 
simultaneously accounting for the heterogeneity at both levels, causing problems of aggregation bias. 
Because of problems of aggregation bias, several works offer an incomplete understanding of these 
effects on the performance of firms, and this may explain the contrast between economic theory and 
the findings of empirical research. To overcome problems of aggregation bias, researchers need to 
consider linkages connecting the micro level with the macro one (Jones, 1991). Following Van Oort 
et al. (2012) and De Groot et al. (2015) it is important to account for the possibility of hierarchies in 
the data, hence the empirical methodology used in this research simultaneously analyzes firm- and 
regional-level data and applies spatial multilevel techniques. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Simultaneously analyzing firm- and regional-level data in the analysis of 
agglomeration mechanisms allows improving empirical reliability. 
1.3 Methodology 
As already explained, this paper overcomes problems of aggregation bias by simultaneously 
analyzing firm- and regional-level data. Van Oort et al. (2012) and De Groot et al. (2015) highlight 
how important it is that the empirical methodology is able to account for the possibility of hierarchies 
in the data and spatial interactions. Hence, in order to consider both the nested structure of the data 
and the spatial dependence of regions and firms, this research combines the multilevel literature with 
spatial econometric techniques.  
Corrado and Fingleton (2011) review, from a theoretical point of view, different 
methodologies to control for spatial spillovers in a hierarchical model. Moreover, Savitz and 
Raudenbush (2009) and Pierewan and Tampubolon (2014) include the geographical interactions by 
adding a spatial lag to the error term of the model. The main drawback of this model is that the 
dependence among neighboring units is left unexplained. This research aims at explaining the spatial 
relationships by modelling a spatial lag for the explanatory variables at the municipal level. The 
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underlying idea is that firm performance not only depends on the characteristics of the firm itself and 
the characteristics of the municipality where the firm is located, but also on the characteristics of the 
surrounding municipalities. For this reason, this study extends the basic hierarchical model by adding 
a spatial lag for the characteristics of the municipality. Hence, the spatial multilevel model here 
proposed is expressed by the following equation. 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 =  𝛾00 + ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑗𝛾𝑘0
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝑧ℎ𝑗𝛾0ℎ
𝐻
ℎ=1
+ ∑ 𝛿0ℎ
𝐻
ℎ=1
∑ 𝑤𝑙𝑗𝑧ℎ𝑙
𝐽
𝑙=1
+  𝑢0𝑗 + ∑ 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑢𝑘𝑗
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (1.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗 is the dependent variable, 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑗 is the 𝑘-th characteristic of firm 𝑖 in region 𝑗, 𝑧ℎ𝑗 is 
the ℎ-th characteristic of region 𝑗, 𝐾 and 𝐻 are the number of regressors at the firm and municipal 
level, respectively. In addition, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the [𝑖, 𝑗]-th element of the spatial weights matrix 𝑊 and is a 
(negative) function of the distance between observation 𝑖 and observation 𝑗, with 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 0  if 𝑖 = 𝑗.
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Finally, 𝜀𝑖  ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) represents the traditional individual level error term, 𝑢0𝑗  ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢0
2 ) is the 
variability arising from differences between municipalities, 𝑢𝑘𝑗 is the variance of the impact of the 
individual characteristics 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑗  ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢𝑘
2 ) on the dependent variable between municipalities and 𝑛 
is the number of observations. 
1.4 Data and variables 
This research considers firms nested into municipalities, the smallest geo-political unit of the 
Swiss canton Ticino. These territorial and political units are able to apply different fiscal policies 
through the level of the municipal tax rate. Additionally, they exhibit some decisional autonomy 
allowing them to invest in infrastructure projects. These considerations allow hypothesizing that 
within the same municipality firms face similar socio-economic, political and cultural environments. 
These reasons justify the choice of using municipalities as second level units. 
The dataset has been created by merging Swiss official secondary data with firm-level data 
obtained from Bisnode Dun & Bradstreet Switzerland Ltd. Bisnode D&B is a partner in the 
worldwide network of Dun & Bradstreet, the largest global service provider for business-to-business 
commercial information and credit history. The dataset comprises 953 firms from the manufacturing 
and services industries located in 68 Ticino municipalities. The reference year of this study is 2011. 
As shown in Table 1.1, the considered sample reasonably represents the 31,689 firms operating in 
Ticino in 2011. 
                                                 
3 According to Anselin (1988), there exist different definitions of the spatial weights matrix 𝑊. At the and of section  1.4 
the specifications used in this study are introduced. 
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Table 1.1 - Comparison between sample and population of firms in Ticino 
 Sample Population 
Number of firms 953 31,689 
Average number of employees per firm 4.96 5.4 
Firms in service sector 82 % 84 % 
Firms located in the district of Bellinzona 8.6 % 11.9 % 
Firms located in the district of Blenio 1.0 % 1.2 % 
Firms located in the district of Leventina 1.3 % 2.1 % 
Firms located in the district of Locarno 15.4 % 17.9 % 
Firms located in the district of Lugano 51.3 % 47.3 % 
Firms located in the district of Mendrisio 18.4 % 15.7 % 
Firms located in the district of Riviera 2.8 % 2.5 % 
Firms located in the district of Vallemaggia 1.2 % 1.5 % 
   
The dependent variable of this study is firm solvency. It is identified with the SCORE 
indicator provided by Bisnode D&B Switzerland Ltd., ranging between 1 and 100, and indicating the 
credit rating profile of firms. This variable is computed by analyzing information concerning the 
payment history, debt collection and recovery information, information regarding operations and 
management as well as ties to other companies, both foreign and domestic. It is important to notice 
that this indicator is not self-reported by firms themselves, instead it is externally calculated in a 
standardized manner. Moreover, Bisnode D&B does not use any measure of agglomeration 
economies to compute the score indicator, ruling out potential problems of endogeneity. This 
indicator can also be interpreted as the inverse of the failure risk of the firms and it is used by the 
financial markets when deciding whether to grant credits to firms, since it allows to decrease the 
asymmetry of information. 
The analysis considers three groups of explanatory variables: establishment-level 
characteristics, municipal-level information and agglomeration economies indices, varying across 
both sectors and municipalities. In order to interpret all the estimations on a similar scale, all the 
continuous independent variables, at both firm and municipal levels, need to be normalized. In 
particular, following Enders and Tofighi (2007), all the continuous municipal-level variables are 
standardized around their grand mean and all the continuous firm-level variables around their group 
mean. This procedure allows the coefficients related to firm-level variables to capture only 
differences within municipalities, and not between municipalities. 
Following the literature on agglomeration economies (Henderson et al., 1995; Combes, 2000; 
Van Oort et al., 2012 and Mameli et al., 2014), this research focuses the analysis on two typologies 
of agglomeration economies, both defined at sectoral and municipal levels. MAR (specialization 
19 
economies) are computed as the ratio of the employment share of sector 𝑠 in municipality 𝑚 divided 
by the same ratio at the overall cantonal level4. JACOBS (urbanization economies) are measured with 
the ratio of the inverse of a Herfindhal index of sectoral concentration of all sectors in municipality 
𝑚, except the considered sector 𝑠 divided by the same ratio at the overall cantonal level5. Data on the 
total number of employees per sector and municipality are obtained from the Swiss structural business 
statistic (STATENT), offered by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO). NOGA 2008 sectoral 
nomenclature (2-digit code) are used, which aggregates sectors into 32 industrial sectors and 48 
service sectors6. 
The availability of firm-level data allows controlling for linear and quadratic effects of the 
AGE of the firms, measured in years (as in Evans, 1987; Raspe and Van Oort, 2011). The underlying 
idea is that firms learn from their own experience. However, as firms evolve over their life cycle, the 
marginal effect of this learning process is expected to decline. Additionally, in order to capture the 
effects related to internal economies of scale and possible size congestion effects, this study also 
accounts for linear and quadratic effects of the SIZE of the firms, computed as the number of 
employees of the firms (following Jovanovic, 1982; Evans, 1987; Raspe and Van Oort, 2011). Finally, 
to distinguish firms in the industrial sector from those working in the service sector, this research 
includes a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the firm is operating in the SERVICE SECTOR, 0 
otherwise (as in McGahan and Porter, 1997 and Van Oort et al., 2012). Data related to firm 
characteristics are obtained from the Bisnode D&B Switzerland Ltd. dataset. Table 1.2 reports the 
descriptive statistics related to firm-level variables as well as those relative to the two indicators of 
agglomeration economies.  
Table 1.2 - Descriptive statistics of firm-level indicators and agglomeration economies 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Score 38.78 16.79 10 97 
Age 23.76 13.29 4 121 
Size (number of employees) 4.96 5.82 1 60 
Service sector (dummy) 0.82 - - - 
MAR 1.67 4.72 0 131 
Jacobs 0.54 0.15 0.10 0.75 
n = 953 firms     
                                                 
4 A value of MAR above 1 implies that in municipality 𝑚 there is a higher employment share in sector 𝑠 than the one 
registered at the cantonal level. The higher the value of MAR, the higher the specialization in sector 𝑠 in municipality 𝑚. 
5 The inverse of the Herfindhal index is maximum when all sectors except the considered sector 𝑠 have the same 
employment share in municipality 𝑚. Hence, a higher value of JACOBS indicates a high degree of diversification for 
sector 𝑠 in municipality 𝑚. 
6 The NOGA 2008 is modelled after the latest version of the Statistical classification of economic activities in the 
European Community (NACE, rev. 2). 
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Besides agglomeration economies indices and characteristics at the firm level, in order to 
prevent problems of omitted-variable bias which might create problems of identification, this study 
also includes some independent variables at the municipal level, which are listed in Table 1.3, and 
Table 1.4 shows the related descriptive statistics (following Henderson et al., 1995; Gordon and 
McCann, 2000; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Raspe and Van Oort, 2008, 2011; Schwellnus and 
Arnold, 2008; Blanchard et al., 2009; De Bok and Van Oort, 2011; Van Oort et al., 2012 and 
Giovannetti et al., 2013).  
Table 1.3 - List of municipal-level variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Airport (dummy) Presence of an airport Federal Office for Spatial 
Development 
Highway – rail 
(dummy) 
Presence of a rail station and/or highway 
ramp 
Federal Office for Spatial 
Development 
Proximity Inverse of travel time to nearest regional 
center7 
Federal Office for Spatial 
Development 
ImmoInv Per capita private investment in immobile 
capital 
B&Wbs (FSO) 
IndArea Industrial and commercial area rate GEOSTAT (FSO) 
University 
(dummy) 
Presence of a university Cantonal Department of 
Education, Culture and Sports 
Custom (dummy) Presence of a custom station8 FSO 
Human capital Per capita number of students in higher 
education levels 
Cantonal Department of 
Education, Culture and Sports 
Social capital Voter turnout State Chancellery of canton 
Ticino 
Tax rate Level of municipal tax rate Cantonal Department of 
Institutions 
Wage Average municipal wage Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration 
Wage growth Average municipal wage growth Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration 
Unemployment 
rate 
Municipal unemployment rate Swiss State Secretariat for 
Economic Affairs 
Population Size of municipal population STATPOP (FSO) 
Population density Number of inhabitants per square kilometer STATPOP (FSO) 
 
                                                 
7 In canton Ticino there are 5 regional centers: Bellinzona, Chiasso, Locarno, Lugano and Mendrisio. 
8 The literature generally uses a dummy taking value 1 if the region shares a border with another nation. However, this 
would skew the results because some municipalities might share a border with another nation, but there might not be 
any infrastructure connecting the municipality with the neighboring nation. Hence, measuring the presence of a customs 
station better captures the possibility of accounting for potential spillover coming from another nation. 
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Table 1.4 - Descriptive statistics of municipal-level indicators 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Airport (dummy) 0.02 - - - 
Highway – rail (dummy) 0.47 - - - 
Proximity 0.18 0.24 0.03 1 
ImmoInv 1.38 2.66 0 13.60 
IndArea 9.06 7.75 0 29.36 
University (dummy) 0.07 - - - 
Custom (dummy) 0.16 - - - 
Human capital 1.88 0.48 0.79 2.92 
Social capital 60.43 6.86 45.72 73.30 
Tax rate 81.91 11.87 53 100 
Wage 72’156 9’959 55’171 111’894 
Wage growth -0.67 5.24 -22.15 6.72 
Unemployment rate 2.82 0.97 1.07 5.69 
Population 4’139 7’004 479 55’151 
Population density 892 1’267 8 8’063 
n = 68 municipalities     
 
A synthesis of municipal indicators 
Analyzing the distribution of the municipal characteristics previously introduced shows that 
these variables are spatially associated. Therefore, this research performs an exploratory factor 
analysis in order to identify the underlying independent structure at the municipal level. Before 
carrying out the analysis, all the continuous variables have been standardized. 
As a first step this study selects the number of factors to obtain. When five unobserved 
variables are identified, only four of these factors have eigenvalues greater than one, while the fifth 
is below. Following Kaiser (1960), only factors having eigenvalues greater than one are considered, 
hence four underlying independent and unobserved variables are identified. To further support this 
choice, the factor analysis with four factors records the lowest BIC value. In order to maximize the 
explained variance, the exploratory factor analysis is performed with VARIMAX-rotation. 
Table 1.5 shows the results of the exploratory factor analysis, reporting for each observed 
variable the corresponding loadings indicating the correlation between these indicators and the 
unobserved four factors. Values in bold indicate the loading of the variables which are combined 
together in the resulting four factors. 
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Table 1.5 - Factor scores at the municipal level 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
 Regional 
centrality 
Welfare Industrialization Rurality 
Airport 0.33 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 
Highway – rail  0.33 -0.02 0.42 -0.33 
Proximity 0.89 0.03 0.01 -0.10 
ImmoInv -0.02 0.05 0.51 -0.18 
IndArea 0.04 -0.00 0.90 -0.02 
University  0.59 0.04 0.12 0.03 
Custom  0.46 -0.05 0.05 -0.08 
Human capital 0.04 0.44 0.15 0.05 
Social capital -0.07 0.32 0.20 0.28 
Tax rate -0.13 -0.61 -0.21 0.53 
Wage 0.01 0.99 -0.05 0.01 
Wage growth -0.11 0.35 -0.04 0.42 
Unemployment rate 0.25 -0.12 0.14 -0.39 
Population 0.79 0.02 0.06 0.12 
Population density 0.21 0.15 0.02 -0.61 
     
The first factor shows high scores on the degree of proximity to a regional center, the level of 
population, the presence of a university as well as the existence of a rail station and/or a highway 
ramp, an airport and a customs station. These characteristics and infrastructures are typical of the 
main regional centers of canton Ticino, hence, this factor is identified as being a measure of the 
“regional centrality” of each municipality. 
Factor 2 combines different dimensions of the level of wellbeing. Particularly, it records high 
scores in locations with high average levels of human capital, social capital, wages and the growth 
rate of wages. Moreover, this factor is negatively related to high levels of tax rate, which usually 
indicate municipalities with low levels of financial health. Therefore, this factor can be identified as 
being a measure of the average level of “welfare” for each location. 
The factor labelled “industrialization” shows high values on the ratio of industrial and 
commercial area divided by the total settlement and urban area, the amount of private investment in 
immobile capital goods (excluding houses) per capita and the presence of a rail station and/or a 
highway ramp. Hence, locations with high scores on this factor can be interpreted as being 
characterized by an environment allowing the industrial and commercial sectors to be particularly 
active. 
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Finally, the fourth factor is positively related to high levels of tax rate and the average growth 
rate of wages. Additionally, it negatively depends on high levels of population density, 
unemployment rate and the presence of a rail station and/or a highway ramp. Municipalities recording 
high scores on this factor can be interpreted as being locations with low levels of infrastructure and 
not densely populated. Therefore, this factor is identified as a measure of “rurality” for each 
municipality. 
The scale of the spatial interactions 
There exist different specifications of the spatial dependence matrix, 𝑊. Savitz and 
Raudenbush (2009) and Pierewan and Tampubolon (2014) use as the spatial dependence matrix, 𝑊, 
a contiguity matrix with entry 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 1 if region 𝑖 and region 𝑗 share at least one border, 0 otherwise. 
This approach restricts spatial interactions. In order to account for the spatial dependence among 
municipalities in a more realistic way, this research considers a spatial weight matrix based on the 
inverse travel times between the centroids of the municipalities9. 
Moreover, the geographical area which this research analyses is characterized by a relatively 
high number of municipalities with rather small territorial extensions. This indicates that, on average, 
the distance between the different municipalities is comparably low. Therefore, the spatial 
interactions of canton Ticino are expected to be on a higher scale than the one considered with a 
contiguity spatial dependence matrix. For these reasons, considering the entire scale of the spatial 
interactions gives a more realistic representation. 
Spatial econometricians (Anselin, 1988; Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; LeSage and Pace, 2009) 
usually standardize the 𝑊 matrix, such that each row sums to unity. This allows interpreting any 
matrix product involving 𝑊 as a weighted average of a certain variable observed in all locations. 
1.5 Results 
Besides finding the impact of agglomeration economies on firm solvency, this analysis has 
three empirical goals and is based on the comparison among eight models. First, this study aims to 
show the importance of the heterogeneity at both firm and regional levels. Second, various 
specifications of a spatial lag are introduced and this study identifies the one best representing reality. 
In particular, different models adding a spatial lag to the error term and/or the municipal independent 
                                                 
9 Travel time data are provided by the Federal Office for Spatial Development and consider the trip by car in minutes. 
The municipalities are based on the 2000 definition of the Swiss Federal Office for Statistics. The distances that involve 
municipalities which were geographically different in 2012 from the official definition of 2000 - because of 
aggregations or newly created municipalities - are computed by weight averaging the distances based on the 2000 
definition and their population. 
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variables are compared. Moreover, this research also distinguishes between contiguity- and distance-
based spatial lags. The goal is not to get involved in a theoretical or methodological debate, rather the 
aim is simply to empirically examine which extension of the spatial spillovers better represent reality. 
The results indicate that spatial effects among municipalities occur in Ticino and take place within 
the entire cantonal territory (distance-based spatial lag added to the independent variables). The third 
goal is to highlight the fact that researchers need to account for spatial slope effects, in order to capture 
cross-municipality differences in the effects of some firm characteristics. This section starts by 
focusing on the comparison between the fit of the different models in order to identify the one best 
capturing reality. Once this model has been identified, the analysis proceeds by interpreting the 
estimates and the results, particularly focusing on the effects of agglomeration externalities. 
Table 1.6 - Model fit comparison 
 Model 
0 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3  
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Firm 
characteristics 
 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Municipal 
characteristics 
 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Spatial error term   YES  YES    
Contiguity-based 
spatial lag 
   YES YES  YES  
Distance-based 
spatial lag 
     YES YES YES 
Random slopes        YES 
Variance 
intercept 
26.0 7.8 4.2 6.6 3.9 6.9 0.1 3.9 
Variance 
residuals 
264 232 232 231 232 226 228.3 206 
Deviance 8060 7914 1713 1907 1906 7888 7878 7863 
# parameters 3 14 15 20 21 20 26 29 
AIC 8066 7942 7943 7947 7948 7928 7930 7921 
BIC 8081 8010 8015 8044 8050 8026 8057 8062 
n: 953 firms in 68 municipalities 
 
In the first model (Model 0), as reported in Table 1.6, the dependent variable is regressed on 
a random intercept without including any regressors. Hence, the intercept can vary randomly across 
municipalities, allowing distinguishing the between-municipality variance of firm performance from 
its between-firm variance. In particular, it is possible to compute the interclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC), measuring the ratio of variance in the dependent variable which is accounted for by 
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municipalities (Luke, 2004). The ICC of Model 0 indicates that 8.96% of the total variance is cross-
municipality variance. The result highlights that less than 10% of the variance among firms is at the 
aggregated level. This underlines the importance of using firm-level data and implies that studies 
considering only aggregated data miss more than 90% of the information, generating the ambiguity 
that indeed characterizes the literature.  
The next step of this study is to explain this variance by including the explanatory variables 
at both firm and municipal levels, without yet considering any spatial interactions. As indicated in 
column 2 of Table 1.6, the variance at the municipal level decreases from 26.0 to 7.8. Additionally, 
by comparing10 the baseline model (Model 0) with the one considering characteristics at both firm 
and regional levels, without any spatial interactions (Model 1), indicates that the baseline model 
provides a significantly worse fit (𝜒2 = 146.4, df = 11, p ≤ 0.001). This result highlights that it is also 
important to account for the heterogeneity at the municipal level in order to decrease the unexplained 
cross-municipality variance of firm performance. 
Subsequently, the model without any spatial interactions (Model 1) is compared with the 
model including a spatial lag in the error term (Model 2) and with the one allowing spatial interactions 
to occur among contiguous municipalities (Model 3). In both cases it is not possible to asses that the 
model without spatial interactions is significantly worse (𝜒2  = 1.3, df = 1, p = 0.26; 𝜒2 = 6.6, df = 6, 
p = 0.36, respectively). Additionally, Model 4 shows that after inserting the spatial lag to the 
independent variables at the municipal level, as already done in Model 3, adding a spatial lag to the 
error term does not allow significantly better capturing the interactions among neighboring units. In 
fact, the model fit provided by Model 1 is not significantly worse than that of Model 4 (𝜒2 = 7.7, df 
= 7, p = 0.36). For this reason, the analysis continues by considering a spatial lag added only to the 
independent variables and considers a different specification of spatial interactions. Particularly, 
Models 2, 3 and 4 are based on a contiguity spatial dependence matrix. However, canton Ticino is 
expected to exhibit spatial relationships on a higher scale than the one considered in the previous 
models. For these reasons, Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 consider a spatial weights matrix based on the inverse 
travel times between the centroids of the municipalities. 
In Model 5 spatial interactions occur within the entire cantonal territory. Comparing its ability 
to fit the data with that of Model 1, the findings suggest that considering this more precise 
specification of the relationships among municipalities is preferable (𝜒2  = 25.4, df = 6, p ≤ 0.001). 
                                                 
10 It is possible to compare two multilevel models if one is nested within the other one. In particular, the difference in 
the deviances of the two models is chi-squared distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the difference of the 
number of estimated parameters (Luke, 2004). 
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Model 6 tests for spatial interactions occurring on more levels simultaneously. In particular, 
it considers relationships taking place within contiguous municipalities and, at the same time, it 
accounts for spatial effects occurring over the entire cantonal territory. The results of Model 6, in 
contrast with those of Model 5, show that controlling for spatial interactions on more levels does not 
significantly improve the ability to analyze and understand the performance of firms (𝜒2 = 10.0, df = 
6, p = 0.12). For this reason, the analysis proceeds by considering only spillovers occurring within 
the entire cantonal territory. 
The different models so far considered allow the intercept to vary across municipalities, but 
they assume that the effects of firm-level characteristics are constant all over the cantonal territory. 
In this respect, as already suggested by Raspe and van Oort (2011), this research seeks to understand 
whether the effects of some firm-level variables may vary across municipalities. Hence, the analysis 
is extended by allowing the parameters associated with firm age, firm size and the level of 
specialization externalities to differ among the various geographical territories. The underlying idea 
is that characteristics at the municipal level might have an impact on the way that firm-level variables 
determine firm performance. 
As reported in Table 1.6, among the considered models, Model 7 best captures reality. In fact, 
besides recording the lowest AIC, by contrasting the model considering spatial interactions in the 
entire cantonal area and with only a random intercept (Model 5) with the one also allowing for random 
slopes (Model 7), the findings suggest that Model 5 is significantly worse (𝜒2  = 24.9, df = 9, p = 
0.003). This clearly indicates that, in order to better capture reality, researchers should control for the 
variance of the effects of some firm-level characteristics across regions. Therefore, the final 
conclusions are based on the results of Model 7, shown in Table 1.7.  
Specifically focusing on the agglomeration economies indicators, the final model underlines 
that, in general, firms situated in Ticino benefit from specialization economies at the municipal level. 
Hence, firms located in municipalities with high concentrations of businesses belonging to the same 
industry have a predicted higher level of solvency. Moreover, the effects of MAR record relatively 
high levels of variance among municipalities, indicating that specialization externalities do not 
homogeneously impact firm performance, but rather heterogeneously. Additionally, the 
diversification measure, on average, is negatively associated with firm solvency. This effect, even 
though it appears to be weak at the municipal level, is stronger and more significant when dynamics 
in the entire cantonal territory are considered. As suggested by Baldwin et al. (2010) and Harris and 
Moffat (2012), this indicates that high degrees of diversification might generate congestion 
diseconomies, which negatively affect firm performance. Considering that canton Ticino is 
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characterized by a relatively low level of industrial density (especially when compared to areas such 
as Zürich, Geneva, Basel or Milan), these findings are in line with those of De Groot et al. (2015), 
which argue that regions with a relatively low level of industrial density are expected to exhibit 
positive specialization effects and negative urbanization externalities. 
Table 1.7 - Spatial multilevel model on firm solvency 
Standardized independent variables                                                  Model 7 
Intercept 41.46 *** 
Age -0.55  
Age*Age 1.91  
Size 6.39 *** 
Size*Size -2.01  
Service sector (dummy) -4.19 *** 
MAR 3.12 *** 
Jacobs -1.29 * 
Regional centrality 0.34  
Welfare -0.05  
Industrialization 1.19  
Rurality -0.20  
Spatial MAR 0.27  
Spatial Jacobs -3.54 *** 
Spatial regional centrality 1.32  
Spatial welfare 4.39 * 
Spatial industrialization -2.09  
Spatial rurality 1.30  
Variance intercept 3.9  
Variance age 9.1  
Variance size 31.1  
Variance MAR 13.9  
Variance residuals 206  
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
n: 953 firms in 68 municipalities 
 
Focusing on firm-level characteristics, linear and quadratic effects of age are simultaneously 
estimated. On average, in canton Ticino it is not possible to assess that firm solvency is affected by 
their age. However, there is a cross-municipality variance associated with the effects of age, 
indicating that there is a certain degree of heterogeneity across municipalities. This analysis also tests 
for the size of a firm by simultaneously estimating linear and quadratic effects. The results indicate 
that, on average, firms located in canton Ticino exhibit strong and significant internal returns to scale, 
in terms of number of employees. Moreover, the strength of these internal economies of scale is 
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location specific, given that the results indicate that the effects of size are heterogeneous across 
municipalities. Additionally, Model 7 shows that firms operating in the service sector have 
significantly lower predicted score levels, ceteris paribus. However, this result might be driven by the 
high proportion of firms in the service sector operating in the wholesale and retail trade sectors, which 
in 2011 were suffering from the particular economic situation generated by the financial crisis of 
2008.  
In addition, Model 7 gives some insight into municipal-level variables. As expected, positive 
and significant effect of the spatial lag of the municipal factor “welfare” is found, indicating that firms 
are expected to benefit from being located in a municipality surrounded by municipalities with high 
levels of human and social capital, economic welfare and low levels of taxation. 
1.6 Conclusions 
The results of this paper highlight that firm solvency provides useful insights in the study of 
agglomeration mechanisms. Traditional analyses on agglomeration economies focus on their effects 
on self-reported indicators of firm performance, such as employment growth or productivity. On the 
contrary, the indicator of firm solvency used in this research is computed from an external and 
standardized perspective. Moreover, this variable is accessible to everyone and helps financial 
markets to reduce asymmetries in information faced when deciding whether to grant credits to firms. 
Hence, the empirical results of this study imply that agglomeration mechanisms shape firm’s 
credit accessibility, along with the characteristics of the firm itself and geographical information. As 
highlighted by the economic literature, this has in turn implications on firm’s investment possibility 
and therefore on their ability to strengthen their productivity. This paper finds that firms located in 
Ticino benefit from the municipal concentration of firms within the same industry, while urbanization 
externalities, at both municipal and cantonal levels, seem to generate congestion diseconomies, 
having a predicted negative impact on firm solvency. Exactly why these results emerge, however, is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
In addition, this paper finds that problems of aggregation bias in the analysis of agglomeration 
economies are important. It is crucial to account for the heterogeneity at both firm and municipal 
levels. In particular, in the context of Ticino, less than 10% of the variance of firm performance is at 
the aggregated level. This implies that when aggregate data are analyzed, more than 90% of the 
information is not considered. This research contributes to the study of agglomeration economies by 
overcoming this problem. In particular, both firm- and regional-level data are analyzed and spatial 
multilevel techniques are applied. The results indicate that to better understand the geography of 
agglomeration mechanisms, researchers do not only need to account for spatial mean effects, by 
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allowing the intercept of the model to vary across municipalities, but also need to control for spatial 
slope effects, in order to capture cross-municipality differences in the effects of some characteristics 
at the firm level. In particular, this research finds that firm age and firm size, as well as MAR 
externalities heterogeneously impact the performance of firms, depending on the context in which the 
firms are located. 
Given the specific characteristics of canton Ticino (a relatively small territory with small firm 
agglomerations), future research will extend the analysis to other geographical contexts in order to 
understand whether the results are confirmed for larger concentrations of firms. Additionally, 
considering more years should permit verifying if the results hold over time or whether they change 
in different economic situations. These extensions will further disambiguate the results of past studies 
and will permit a clearer judgment concerning the relevance of cluster-based economic policies. 
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2. Chapter 2: The impact of language borders on the spatial 
decay of agglomeration spillovers 11 
Daniele Mantegazzi, Philip McCann, Viktor Venhorst 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Recent research argues that ‘soft’ institutions, like language and culture, are interrelated with 
the working of the spatial economy. In a geographical setting there is evidence that culture affects 
interpersonal relationships but there is no equivalent evidence regarding the effects of culture on 
agglomeration spillovers. This paper examines whether language, a specific dimension of culture, 
affects the geographical extension of agglomeration spillovers by observing the geography of 
employment patterns in a linguistically discontinuous setting. The findings, for the first time, provide 
empirical evidence that independent of governance and institutional issues, language borders 
differently shape the distance decay of agglomeration spillovers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: O18; R11; R12; Z10 
Keywords: Agglomeration externalities, Economic geography, Spatial decay, Language. 
 
 
                                                 
11 This chapter is based on Mantegazzi, McCann and Venhorst (2017), The impact of language borders on the spatial 
decay of agglomeration spillovers. Presented at the 57th ERSA Congress, Groningen. Revised and resubmitted to an 
international journal. Minor editorial changes have been made for a better fit with the style of the thesis. 
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2.1 Introduction 
A growing body of literature highlights that culture and the economy are interrelated 
(Beugelsdijk and Maseland, 2011; De Jong, 2009), via the influence of culture on shaping the ‘soft’ 
or informal institutional underpinnings of the economy. Following these ideas, for economic 
geographers there are broadly two lines of argumentation deployed in the literature. First, some 
economic geographers (Pike et al., 2011; Storper, 2013) consider that culture and informal or soft 
institutions heavily shape and are shaped by economic geography, at least as much as by hard 
institutions. These arguments tend to focus on the nature and the quality of the institutional settings 
and in particular on the role played by the institutional set-up in facilitating participation and 
engagement by different constituencies in the economy. Second, there are other economic geography 
arguments and evidence that cultural markers, defined primarily in terms of ethnic diversity (Bakkens 
et al., 2013; Tselios et al., 2015a, 2015b; Nijkamp et al., 2015), influence interpersonal relationships, 
and in a spatial setting these interpersonal relationships in turn influence local economic outcomes. 
Yet, in general the links between economic geography and culture still remain rather vague and 
contested. There are some scholars who argue that culture cannot be modeled as such, particularly as 
it pertains to the former argument; while other scholars are skeptical of the role played by culture in 
shaping economic geography, unless this can be demonstrated analytically in a formal model setting, 
something which has never previously been done. 
The purpose of this paper is not to engage in these types of conceptual, theoretical or 
methodological debates. Rather, the aim is simply to examine whether there is any detailed empirical 
evidence that a particular dimension of culture, namely language (Tabellini 2008), does indeed 
influence economic geography, in a context where neither ethnic diversity nor differing nor poor 
institutional quality are key features. More specifically, this study examines whether language borders 
influence one particular aspect of economic geography, specifically the geographical extension of 
different types of agglomeration spillovers within the same country. To capture any such spillover 
effects, the analysis empirically examines how local employment patterns are related to linguistic 
differences between localities. The paper focuses on Switzerland, which represents an appropriate 
case-study for examining these types of differences, because, as underlined by Eugster et al. (2011), 
these clearly defined and sharp language borders are not associated with changes in the geographical 
or political setting. Neither the nature nor the quality of the institutional and governance set-up varies 
according to the local linguistic context, so any observed effects cannot be attributed to either national 
or regional governance issues. 
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In this context, the study tracks how employment patterns in one locality are related to those 
in neighboring localities, and examines whether these relationships differ across language borders in 
a manner which is distinct from simply different locality administrative borders. In particular, this 
analysis examines whether employment specialization or diversity patterns differ across different 
types of borders, after controlling for geographical, economic and topographical features. The 
tracking of employment patterns is not in any way meant to be a test or an advocating of any particular 
model of regional growth or spillovers, as this topic has been a source of much debate over the last 
three decades. Rather, the methodology employed is simply the most direct method of identifying 
whether the geography of agglomeration spillovers affects and is affected by linguistic differences, 
while making no claims as to the mechanisms underlying any such linkages or spillovers. 
This empirical approach demonstrates that language borders do indeed affect the spatial decay 
of various proxies for agglomeration spillovers, in different ways. Moreover, given that this one 
particular feature of culture, namely linguistic differences, can be shown in this specific context to 
affect this one particular aspect of economic geography, namely agglomeration-employment 
spillovers, these empirical results support those scholars arguing that culture shapes, and is shaped 
by, economic geography. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant 
literature. In Section 3 the econometric model is described. The database is presented in Section 4, 
followed by the empirical results in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. 
2.2 Literature review 
As mentioned above, a growing body of literature highlights that culture and soft or informal 
institutions and economy are interrelated (Beugelsdijk and Maseland, 2011; De Jong, 2009; Pike et 
al., 2011; Storper, 2013; Nathan and Lee, 2013; du Gay and Pryke, 2002; Gertler, 2003; Cooke and 
Lazzeretti, 2008). In particular, cultural characteristics may impact on economic behavior and 
economic geography processes in different ways and which in turn may lead to regional 
differentiation. Moreover, the literature on border effects (Brakman et al., 2012) also points to such 
conclusions, whereby both the underlying behavior and the spatial extension of spillovers may be 
shaped by the presence of different types of borders. 
At the same time, the existing literature on agglomeration spillovers is itself characterized by 
a largely unresolved debate regarding the effects of these various mechanisms in shaping, or being 
shaped by, economic geography. Indeed, recent meta-analyses (Melo et al., 2009; Beaudry and 
Schiffauerova, 2009; De Groot et al., 2015) highlight that the results are still rather unclear and 
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inconclusive in determining whether localization or urbanization economies generate different 
outcomes in different contexts, although it is clear that any observed spillover effects attenuate with 
distance (Fotheringham and Pitts, 1995; Rosenthal and Strange, 2003; Rice et al., 2006; Smit and De 
Groot, 2013; Saito and Wu, 2016). As such, there is no general consensus on the spatial extension of 
these spillovers, and no evidence whatsoever on the role played by culture in shaping these effects. 
In fact, traditional analyses generally do not include issues of culture, thereby disregarding whether 
various cultural environments heterogeneously affect the geographical extension of agglomeration 
spillovers. In particular, the fact that different spatial units (e.g. municipalities, regions) may or may 
not share common cultural characteristics is typically not considered, neglecting whether and how 
this may impact on the externalities arising from the concentration of firms. 
Yet, in order to better understand how culture may impact on the different costs and benefits 
related to the regional concentration of firms, this research focuses on one particular dimension of 
culture, namely language (Tabellini 2008), and aims at verifying whether the existence of linguistic 
differences across Swiss municipalities has an impact on the geographical extension of the benefits 
that firms might gain from being located near to other business activities. The underlying research 
question of this study is the following: do linguistic discontinuities impact on the spatial decay of 
agglomeration spillovers? 
In general, the absence of previous studies on the relationship between language and 
agglomeration spillovers implies that there is no clear guideline or model allowing forming a priori 
hypotheses. However, there are some heuristics that can give some ideas on how language and 
agglomerations might be related. Previous studies on the economic effects of cultural diversity 
indicate that the direction of the impact could be either positive or negative. Cultural diversity can 
increase the economic performance because of skill complementarities (Lazear, 1999), learning 
processes (Berliant and Fujita, 2008), or augmented social capital (Putnam, 2007). On the other hand, 
cultural diversity may also create communication barriers or social conflicts that generate excessive 
transaction costs (Kochan et al., 2003). Given that both forces take place at the same time, it is difficult 
to form hypotheses. However, the nature of the various types of agglomeration mechanism may help 
in order to form some expectations. Specifically, specialization externalities tend to imply that 
learning forces are concentrated within “industrial communities”, suggesting that linguistic 
differences might act as an obstacle to wider spread effects. Alternatively, Jacobs (1969) indicates 
that some learning mechanisms are facilitated in diverse environment, implying that the coexistence 
of different languages might boost agglomeration spillovers across various spatial scales. In general, 
diversified cities and regions tend to exhibit wide ranging linkages (McCann and Acs, 2011; Caragliu 
et al., 2016). Again, the net result is ambiguous and therefore it is difficult to suggest an a priori 
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hypothesis. All that can be said at this stage is that while there are grounds for believing that linguistic 
differences may shape the patterns of agglomeration spillovers, the links between linguistic patterns 
and the spatial and distance-decay of agglomeration effects cannot be specified ex ante. 
In order to investigate these issues, Switzerland represents a very interesting case because it 
does not suffer from problems of poor institutions, it has strong and homogeneous general economic 
conditions (Nunziata and Rocco, 2016) and, as shown in Figure 2.1, it consists of four language 
regions: German, French, Italian and Romansh12. In general, language does not always coincide with 
culture, in that there might be situations in which the same culture is shared among groups of people 
with different languages, or circumstances in which different cultures coexist within the same 
linguistic area. Moreover, in Switzerland people generally speak more than one national language13 
and might therefore be able to communicate with people from another linguistic region. Nevertheless, 
even though language borders do not stop communication between the different language areas in 
Switzerland, the language barrier between Swiss linguistic areas is sharp14 and there are clear cultural 
gaps, because native languages are the medium through which attitudes, norms, beliefs and values 
are transmitted from one generation to the next (Eugster et al., 2011). In fact, as highlighted by 
Hofstede (2001), in the Swiss context the various linguistic regions are clearly associated with 
different cultures, with wide cultural differences between the language areas, as reflected, for 
example, also in different voting patterns (Goldberg, 2017), different fiscal preferences (Eugster and 
Parchet, 2018), different demands for redistributive social insurance (Eugster et al., 2011) or different 
attitudes towards work (Diekmann et al., 1998). Moreover, as underlined by Eugster et al. (2011), 
this clearly defined and sharp language border is not associated with changes in the geographical or 
institutional settings. This context therefore allows analyzing the impact of linguistic discontinuities 
on the spatial extension of agglomeration spillovers by comparing these effects across the various 
Swiss language regions, based on the plausible assumption that at this border there are no additional 
factors other than language - representing a specific dimension of culture - that change in such a 
discontinuous way. 
 
 
                                                 
12 These are the four official languages in Switzerland. German is spoken by 63.7% of the Swiss population, French by 
20.4%, Italian by 6.5%, and Romansh by 0.5%. 
13 According to Werlen (2008), about 73% of the inhabitants of the French speaking areas of Switzerland speak also 
another national language. This value is equal to 85% for the inhabitants of the German speaking parts and 92% for 
those of the Italian speaking regions. 
14 At the language border between the French and the German speaking regions of Switzerland, the number of 
inhabitants whose mother tongue is French (German) drops from more than 90% to less than 5% within 5 kilometres.  
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Figure 2.1 - Dominant national language in all Swiss municipalities, 2000 
 
Data Source: Federal Population Census (2000) of the Swiss Federal Statistic Office 
2.3 Methodology 
In this analysis, Swiss municipalities are grouped into different linguistic categories whereas 
the industrial sectors are not, and the aim is to examine whether the sectoral employment patterns 
and distributions observed across different distances and municipal boundaries differ according to 
linguistic borders they traverse. Yet, the task of this study is not simply a matter of adding a 
linguistic variable to existing analytical frameworks. Rather, the aim is to empirically examine 
whether linguistic differences shape the spatial distance-decay properties of agglomeration 
spillovers. Following Van Oort et al. (2012) and De Groot et al. (2015), it is important that the 
empirical methodology applied is able to account for the possibility of hierarchies in the data. 
Therefore, this paper analyzes a cross-classified multilevel model in which firms are nested into 
both municipalities and sectors. This implies that the model is able to account for possible 
correlation within the same sector and within the same municipality. Hence, the model here 
estimated has the form represented in equation (2.1). 
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𝑦𝑓𝑚𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝑡𝑣) (𝑥𝑘𝑓𝑚𝑠𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑘𝑓𝑚𝑠)
𝐾
𝑘=1
+   ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝑡𝑖) ?̅?𝑘𝑓𝑚𝑠
𝐾
𝑘=1
+  ∑ 𝛾ℎ𝑧ℎ𝑚𝑡
𝐻
ℎ=1
+  ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑡 + 
𝐼
𝑖=1
∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑟𝑖(𝑠𝑙) ∑ 𝑤𝑛𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡
 
𝑛≠𝑚
∀ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑟
∀ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑛= 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑅
𝑟=1
+  ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑟𝑖(𝑑𝑙) ∑ 𝑤𝑛𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡
 
𝑛≠𝑚
∀ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑟
∀ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑛≠ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑚
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑅
𝑟=1
+  𝜉 𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜇𝑚 +  𝜇𝑠 +  𝜀𝑓𝑚𝑠𝑡 
(2.1) 
 Where 𝑦𝑓𝑚𝑠𝑡 is the performance of firm 𝑓, located in municipality 𝑚, operating in sector 𝑠 in 
time 𝑡. Additionally, (𝑥𝑘𝑓𝑚𝑠𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑘𝑓𝑚𝑠) is the time-varying component of the 𝑘-th firm-level 
variable, whereas ?̅?𝑘𝑓𝑚𝑠 is its time-invariant component
15. 𝑧ℎ𝑚𝑡 is the ℎ-th municipal characteristics, 
𝐾 and 𝐻 are the number of firm-level regressors and municipal regressors, respectively. Moreover, 
𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑡 is the 𝑖-th agglomeration index, with 𝐼 being the total number of agglomeration indices. 𝜃𝑟𝑖(𝑠𝑙) 
and 𝜃𝑟𝑖(𝑑𝑙) allow measuring the geographical extension of agglomeration spillovers in municipalities 
with the same language and in those with a different language, respectively. As explained in the next 
section, this study follows Rosenthal and Strange (2003) and builds 𝑅 concentric rings at different 
distances from municipality 𝑚 and for each type of agglomeration economies 𝑖 computes its spatial 
lag, by weight averaging the indices of the municipalities 𝑛 intersected by ring 𝑟, where 𝑤𝑛 represents 
the weight of municipality 𝑛.  In order to analyze whether the existence of language borders has an 
impact on the spatial decay of agglomeration spillovers, two different spatial lags for agglomeration 
economies are computed: one for municipalities 𝑛 intersected by ring 𝑟 that share the same language 
of municipality 𝑚 and one for those that do not share the same language. Finally, 𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 is a dummy 
variable capturing year fixed effects, 𝜇𝑚 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑚
2 ), 𝜇𝑠~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑠
2) and 𝜀𝑓𝑚𝑠𝑡~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑓
2) are error 
terms at the municipal, sectoral and individual levels, respectively. 
2.4 Data and variables 
This study analyzes a large balanced panel dataset constructed from the official Swiss 
structural business statistic (STATENT), offered by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) and 
covering the period 2011 – 2013. This database provides basic information on all establishments in 
Switzerland, with about 650,000 observations annually. This analysis only considers observations 
                                                 
15 As explained in the next section, firm-level heterogeneity bias is controlled for by applying Mundlak’s (1978) 
approach, which allows estimating the time-varying and time-invariant components of firm-level variables. 
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present in all the three years and located in municipalities with at least three establishments per year16. 
This database has been combined with Swiss official secondary data at the municipal level. After 
selecting the data as described above, the resulting database comprises 475,088 establishments from 
both the manufacturing and service sectors which are located in 2,362 Swiss municipalities. 
Following the spirit of the seminal papers in the analysis of agglomeration economies (for an 
overview see Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009; and Combes and Gobillon, 2015), the establishment-
level employment growth is used as dependent variable, which is computed as the difference in the 
log of number of employees between year 𝑡 and year 𝑡 + 1. In the literature, this is the most widely-
used indicator of agglomeration-spillovers (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009), and is the only 
dependent variable which these data permits employing. The agglomeration-related literature 
suggests that in some cases such spillovers might be labor saving or the labor supply may be inelastic 
and therefore they may not necessarily translate into employment growth (Combes et al., 2004; 
Suedekum, 2009). However, using Mundlak’s approach allows considering the net effect on 
employment growth, net of labor saving and capital/labor substitution occurring at the level of each 
firm. 
As seen in the previous section, the explanatory variables can be divided into establishment-
level variables, municipal-level variables and agglomeration indices, which vary across both sectors 
and municipalities. Additionally, in order to compare the different estimates, all the independent 
variables are normalized. Specifically, this study follows Enders and Tofighi (2007) and standardizes 
the municipal-level variables around their grand mean and the firm-level variables around their group 
mean. This approach allows the effects of the firm-level variables to capture only within 
municipalities differences, and not between municipalities. 
Agglomeration economies indices 
The main interest of this research is to analyze the spatial decay of agglomeration spillovers, 
with a particular interest in determining whether the existence of a language border between 
municipalities has an impact on it. The analysis considers three different typologies of agglomeration 
spillovers: specialization, competition and diversity. In order to measure specialization, a simple 
location quotient is considered, which is computed as the ratio of the employment share of sector 𝑠 
                                                 
16 This selection procedure is required because from the dataset it is not possible to distinguish between establishments 
that became insolvent from those that are censored due to merger or voluntary liquidation. Buehler et al. (2012) find in 
their analyses that in Switzerland, between 1995 and 2000, about 6% of firms become insolvent and 9% exit due to 
merger or voluntary liquidation. Hence, it seems reasonable that this selection procedure does not generate problems of 
selection bias because it is not excluding only establishments that failed, and they only represent a minor part of Swiss 
establishments. 
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in municipality 𝑚 divided by the same ratio at the national level17. In terms of competition, the relative 
number of firms per employee is considered, which is computed as the number of firms in sector 𝑠 in 
municipality 𝑚 divided by the number of employees working in the same sector and in the same 
municipality, scaled by the same ratio at the national level. Finally, diversity is measured as the ratio 
of the inverse of a modified Hirschman-Herfindahl index of sectoral concentration of all sectors in 
municipality 𝑚, except the considered sector 𝑠, divided by the same ratio at the overall national 
level18. In order to compute these indices, data on the total number of firms and employees per sector 
and municipality are used, which are obtained from the STATENT provided by the FSO. 
As described in Groot et al. (2014), the literature uses different indices to measure the various 
types of agglomeration economies. The vast majority of the studies studying agglomeration spillovers 
uses indices based on shares, as in the case of the indices presented above. Hence, in order to be most 
consistent with the literature, these indices are considered to be the preferred specification. 
Nevertheless, the results are tested using also alternative measures of these variables, in order to verify 
whether the findings are consistent across the various specifications. In particular, as a robustness 
check, in order to measure specialization, the share of sector 𝑠 on total employment in municipality 
𝑚 is also used. Moreover, in terms of competition the absolute number of firms per employee in 
sector 𝑠 in municipality 𝑚 is also considered. 
As mentioned above, in order to measure the geographical extension of agglomeration 
spillovers, this study adopts the approach used in Rosenthal and Strange (2003) and applied in various 
other studies (Fu, 2007; Baldwin et al., 2008; Rosenthal and Strange, 2008; Graham, 2009; Smit and 
De Groot, 2013 and Saito and Wu, 2016). Specifically, for each municipality 𝑚 concentric rings at 
different distances from the centroid of that municipality are built and for each ring the spatial lag of 
the three types of agglomeration spillovers are computed by weight-averaging the indices of the 
municipalities intersected by the corresponding ring. Agglomeration spillovers are by definition 
higher when there is a larger working force. To account for the fact that different municipalities with 
a similar value of agglomeration indices might have different sizes in terms of workers, the weighting 
procedure considers the size of the surrounding municipalities in terms of number of employees and 
gives more importance to those municipalities with a larger working force. In addition, for each ring 
and for each typology of agglomeration spillovers two different spatial lags are built: one for those 
municipalities within the ring which have the same language of municipality 𝑚, and one for those 
                                                 
17 A value of specialization above 1 means that in municipality m the employment share of sector s is higher than the 
national average. Appendix 2.A provides the formula used in the construction of this index. 
18 Higher values of diversification imply that the employment share of all the other sectors in municipality m are more 
similar. On the contrary, lower values of this index mean that the majority of the workforce in municipality m is 
employed in few sectors. Appendix 2.A provides the formula used in the construction of this index. 
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municipality which have a different language. From a theoretical perspective there is no a priori 
guidance on how many rings to consider and how large these rings should be. However, from an 
empirical point of view it is possible to have a meaningful insight by considering the spatial 
distribution of cities and municipalities. After analyzing this distribution in the Swiss context19, a 
cutoff distance at 45 minute travel time is imposed and rings of 15 minute travel time are considered, 
because they provide reasonably detailed information about the spatial decay of the concentration of 
firms. The advantage of travel time is that it allows comparing regions characterized by very different 
topographical environments, which is crucial in a context like Switzerland where there are both flat 
areas and regions with very high mountains20.  
Figure 2.2 - Spatial-lag rings 
 
                                                 
19 The spatial distribution of cities and municipalities in Switzerland is presented in Appendix 2.B. 
20 Considering travel time distances implies that from a graphical perspective the rings have a modified circular shape, 
depending on the morphological characteristics of the surrounding area. 
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Thus, as shown in Figure 2.2, in which the case of the municipality of Jaun21 – marked in 
black – is graphically represented, following this approach, for each typology of agglomeration 
spillovers and for each linguistic group three different spatial lags are obtained – marked in grey in 
Figure 2.2, with decreasing intensity for rings that are farther away and with the language border 
represented by the solid black line22. 
Table 2.1 provides information concerning the distance of Swiss municipalities from the 
nearest language border. In particular, about 10% of the Swiss municipalities are less than a 15 minute 
travel time from a municipality which belongs to another language region. In addition, the table shows 
that 30% of Swiss municipalities are less than a 30 minute travel time from a language border and 
more than 50% are less than a 45 minute travel time from it. This clearly indicates that linguistic 
discontinuities involve a conspicuous part of Swiss municipalities. 
Table 2.1 - Distance of Swiss municipalities from a language border 
Distance from different 
language region (in minute) 
Number of municipalities Frequency  
0 – 15  239 9.8% 
15 – 30  477 19.9% 
30 – 45 520 21.7% 
> 45  1160 48.6% 
   
Mameli et al. (2014) demonstrate that the empirical results on the analysis of agglomeration 
economies can be very different depending on the level of sectoral aggregation considered. 
Furthermore, the authors find that it is generally preferable to analyze more disaggregated data. 
Hence, this research focuses on the study of the spatial decay of agglomeration spillovers using a 
NOGA 2008 four-digits sectoral specification23, which allows analyzing 545 different sectors. 
Establishment-level variables 
The accessibility to establishment-level information allows capturing the effects related to 
internal economies of scale and also potential size-related congestion effects, by controlling for log-
linear and log-quadratic effects of the size of establishments, computed as the number of employees 
of each establishment (following Jovanovic, 1982; Evans, 1987; Carroll and Hannan, 2000; 
                                                 
21 The only reason the graphical representation is focusing on the municipality of Jaun is that it is located near a 
language border, which allows showing how this study considers linguistic discontinuities in this analysis. 
22 Appendix 2.C shows the descriptive statistic of the dependent variable, the three typologies of agglomeration 
spillovers and their spatial lags. Appendix 2.D presents the correlation between the agglomeration indices and their 
spatial lags. 
23 The NOGA 2008 is modelled after the latest version of the Statistical classification of economic activities in the 
European Community (NACE, rev. 2). 
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Audretsch and Dohse, 2007; Raspe and Van Oort, 2008 and 2011). Additionally, the gender 
composition of the workforce at the establishment level is used as a control variable, which is 
computed as the number of female workers divided by the total number of employees. Using the 
STATENT database allows considering all the establishments located in Switzerland. However, it 
contains very few variables at the establishment level, so, in order to correct for establishment-level 
heterogeneity bias, Mundlak’s (1978) approach is applied. As highlighted in Bell and Jones (2015), 
this procedure allows estimating the time-invariant component of establishment-level variables, 
which provides fixed effects estimates, and the time-varying component of the same variables. 
Municipal-level variables 
In order to avoid problems of omitted-variable bias which might cause problems of 
identification with regards to the measure of the effects of agglomeration spillovers and their spatial 
extension, a large variety of characteristics at the municipal level are controlled for, which can be 
classified into five broad categories24.  
The first groups all the demographic information at the municipal level in year 𝑡 (following 
Combes, 2000; Audretsch and Dohse, 2007; Brülhart and Sbergami, 2009; Raspe and Van Oort, 2008, 
2011 and Mameli et al., 2014). The second category collects all the socio-economic information at 
the municipal level in year 𝑡 (following Henderson et al., 1995; Blanchard et al., 1995; Gordon and 
McCann, 2000; Audretsch and Dohse, 2007; Brülhart and Sbergami, 2009 and Raspe and Van Oort, 
2008, 2011).  The third category of municipal-level independent variables groups all the information 
related to the private and public level of investments in 11 types of infrastructure in every municipality 
in year 𝑡 (as done in in Eberts and McMillen, 1999; Fingleton and McCann, 2007; De Bok and Van 
Oort, 2011; Raspe and Van Oort, 2011; Giovanetti et al., 2013 and Mameli et al., 2014). The fourth 
category includes municipal-level independent variables providing information about the 
infrastructure accessibility of each municipality in year 𝑡 (following Eberts and McMillen, 1999; 
Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Fingleton and McCann, 2007; De Bok and Van Oort, 2011; Giovanetti 
et al., 2013 and Mameli et al., 2014). Finally, the fifth category collects information concerning the 
cultural composition of each municipality. 
2.5 Results 
This section first describes the empirical results based on regressing the model using the 
preferred specification of agglomeration spillovers. Subsequently, a series of robustness checks are 
performed in order to confirm that these results are consistent across various dimensions. In 
                                                 
24 The list of the control variables at the municipal level included in each category is presented in Appendix 2.E. 
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particular, the aim of the second part of the analysis is to verify whether the specification used impacts 
on the validity of the results. Moreover, potential problems related to reverse causality are also tested 
for.  
Estimation results 
Table 2.2 reports the estimates of the effects of agglomeration spillovers at various distances 
from their location, taking into consideration linguistic differences.  
Table 2.2 - Cross-classified multilevel model on employment growth at the establishment level in 
Switzerland 
          
Fixed effects:         
Specialization 0,0000  (0,0005) 
Spatial lags: Same language Different language 
Specialization 0-15 min 0,0013*  (0,0006) -0,0008  (0,0005) 
Specialization 15-30 min -0,0006  (0,0006) -0,0002  (0,0005) 
Specialization 30-45 min 0,0003  (0,0005) -0,0004  (0,0006) 
     
Competition -0,0006  (0,0006) 
Spatial lags: Same language Different language 
Competition 0-15 min -0,0013*  (0,0005) 0,0009  (0,0005) 
Competition 15-30 min 0,0005  (0,0006) 0,0003  (0,0006) 
Competition 30-45 min 0,0003  (0,0006) 0,0003  (0,0006) 
     
Diversity -0,0082  (0,0070) 
Spatial lags: Same language Different language 
Diversity 0-15 min -0,0100  (0,0089) 0,0201  (0,0233) 
Diversity 15-30 min -0,0092  (0,0085) 0,0418*  (0,0151) 
Diversity 30-45 min 0,0026  (0,0086) 0,0275  (0,0214) 
     
Random effects:     
Municipal-level variance 0,0000 
Sector-level variance (4 digit) 0,0003 
Establishment-level variance 0,0548 
     
Municipal-level variables Yes 
Establishment-level variables Yes 
Mundlack correction Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Deviance 121'323 
Observations 950'176; 2'362 municipalities; 545 sectors 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; standard errors between parentheses  
 
The results allow separately analyzing the geographical extension of the three typologies of 
agglomeration spillovers considered, differentiating between the spatial decay in regions with the 
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same language from those with a different language. Specifically, for each typology of agglomeration 
spillovers it is possible to graphically represent their effects on employment growth at the firm level 
at various distances (on the horizontal axis) in areas with the same language (marked in blue) and in 
areas with a different language (marked in red), with the 95 percent confidence interval in each case 
(represented with vertical lines around the point estimates). This graphical representation allows 
clearly visualizing whether the pattern of the spatial extension of the various types of agglomeration 
spillovers differ between regions with the same language from those with a different language. 
Figure 2.3 shows the results related to specialization externalities. The direct estimate at the 
municipal level is not significantly different from zero. This means that, on average, the concentration 
of business activities operating in the same industrial sector and in the same municipality does not 
affect these firms in terms of employment growth. Considering the spatial lag of specialization in 
municipalities located less than a 15 minute travel time away, the effect is positive and statistically 
significant in municipalities with the same language, whereas the result is negative but not statistically 
significant in municipalities with a different language. Hence, employment growth at the firm level 
is significantly higher when there is a high concentration of firms operating in the same industrial 
sector in municipalities belonging to the same linguistic region and located less than a 15 minute 
travel time away. No such effect operates for linguistic barriers within the same spatial domain. 
However, at distances above a 15 minute travel time the results are never significantly different from 
zero. 
Figure 2.3 - The geographical extension of specialization externalities 
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Figure 2.4 shows the results related to competition externalities. The direct estimate of 
competition spillovers at the municipal level is not significantly different from zero. Considering the 
spatial lag of competition in municipalities located less than a 15 minute travel time away, the effect 
is negative and statistically significant in municipalities with the same language, whereas the result 
is positive but not statistically significant in municipalities with a different language. This means that 
employment growth at the firm level is significantly lower when there are high levels of competition 
in municipalities belonging to the same language region and located less than 15 minute travel time 
away. Furthermore, competition externalities within a 15 minute travel time in municipalities with 
the same language are significantly different from the result in municipalities with a different 
language. This indicates that in these two types of regions the estimates for competition effects follow 
different patterns. At distances above a 15 minute travel time the results are never significantly 
different from zero. 
Figure 2.4 – The geographical extension of competition externalities 
 
Figure 2.5 reports the results concerning diversity externalities. The direct estimate of 
diversity spillovers at the municipal level is not significantly different from zero. This implies that, 
on average, the employment growth of firms is not affected by the level of local diversity, measured 
as the inverse of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. Focusing the attention on the spatial lag of diversity 
in the surrounding municipalities, the findings indicate that in communes located between a 15 and 
30 minute travel time away, the effect is positive and statistically significant in municipalities with a 
different language, whereas the result is negative but not statistically significant in municipalities 
with the same language. Hence, employment growth at the firm level is significantly higher when 
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there are high levels of diversity in municipalities belonging to a different language region and located 
nearby. More specifically, while the differences are evident within a 15 minute travel time they are 
even more marked between 15 and 30 minute travel times. Beyond these travel times the results are 
never significantly different from zero. 
Figure 2.5 – The geographical extension of diversity externalities 
 
These results indicate that, in each case, the direct estimates at the municipal level are not 
significant, whereas the different types of agglomeration-spillover effects become significant in 
different ways at relatively larger distances, depending on the presence of a linguistic barrier, and 
then vanish again farther away. Given that the average size of Swiss municipalities is only 3500 
people, the direct results at the municipal level are consistent with the arguments of Baldwin et al. 
(2010) and Harris and Moffat (2012) who suggest that congestion diseconomies generated by the 
agglomerations of firms might offset the benefit of these concentrations at really short distances. 
Similarly, the observation that specialization and competition externalities attenuate with distance are 
also consistent with the findings of Hoogstra and Van Dijk (2004) and Smit and De Groot (2013), 
while the diversity results are consistent with those of Fu (2007) who found that diversity externalities 
extend further and take place on a larger geographical area. As far as the authors of this study are 
aware, this is the first time that these effects of language borders or barriers on agglomeration 
spillovers have ever been observed empirically, and they also appear to be consistent with other 
evidence on agglomeration-spillover effects. 
Robustness checks 
In the second part of this section, the aim is to verify whether the results of this study, namely 
that linguistic differences affect the geographical extension of different types of agglomeration 
spillovers in different ways, are consistent across different dimensions, and are not simply a spurious 
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outcome of operationalization decisions. In particular, the aim of this part of the analysis is first to 
test the findings by considering different specifications of agglomeration spillovers, and then check 
whether potential problems of reverse causality affect the outcome.  
Table 2.3 reports the estimates of agglomeration spillovers at various distances from their 
location, taking into consideration linguistic differences, for all the robustness checks above 
mentioned. All these robustness checks only aim at attesting whether language still affects the spatial 
extension of agglomeration spillovers by using different specifications along several dimensions. For 
this reason, Table 3 only reports the estimates of agglomeration spillovers. 
In this part of the analysis, alternative indices identified by the literature to measure the various 
types of agglomeration spillovers25 are also considered. Specifically, in order to measure 
specialization, the share of each sector in each municipality is also used (Model 2 and Model 3 of 
Table 3). Additionally, to measure competition, the absolute number of firms per employee in each 
sector in each municipality is also considered (Model 1 and Model 3 of Table 3). The results indicate 
that regardless of the specification used, the spatial decay of agglomeration spillovers differs 
significantly depending on whether the geographical extension involves municipalities with the same 
language or with a different language. In particular, considering the absolute number of firms per 
employee as index for competition this research finds similar and even stronger results. In fact, in 
addition to the significant difference for competition externalities between municipalities belonging 
to the same linguistic area and those that do not, between 0 and 15 minute travel time away, a 
difference in the significance for competition externalities at a distance between 30 and 45 minute 
travel time is also found. Moreover, considering the sectoral share as index for specialization, similar 
results are also found, even though slightly weaker. In fact, the significant difference for 
specialization externalities between municipalities belonging to the same linguistic area and those 
that do not, between 0 and 15 minute travel time away is no longer found, nevertheless, a difference 
in the significance for specialization externalities at a distance between 15 and 30 minute travel time 
is found.
                                                 
25 Appendix 2.A provides the formula used in the construction of these indices. 
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Table 2.3 – Robustness check cross-classified multilevel models on employment growth at the establishment level in Switzerland 
 
 
  
Model 1 - competition as absolute 
number of firms per employee 
Model 2 - specialization as sectoral 
share 
Model 3 - competition as absolute 
number of firms per employee and 
specialization as sectoral share 
Model 4 - time lag 
Specialization -0,0004 (0,0005) 0,0035** (0,0007) 0,0027** (0,0008) 0,0006 (0,0009) 
Spatial lags: Same language Different language Same language Different language Same language Different language Same language Different language 
Specialization 0-15 min 0,0011* (0,0006) -0,0008 (0,0005) 0,0002 (0,0009) -0,0010 (0,0006) -0,0001 (0,0009) -0,0009 (0,0006) 0,0022* (0,0010) -0,0009 (0,0009) 
Specialization 15-30 min -0,0007 (0,0006) -0,0002 (0,0005) 0,0012 (0,0010) -0,0016* (0,0007) 0,0010 (0,0010) -0,0015* (0,0007) -0,0001 (0,0010) 0,0003 (0,0009) 
Specialization 30-45 min 0,0002 (0,0005) -0,0003 (0,0006) 0,0009 (0,0009) 0,0013 (0,0007) 0,0008 (0,0009) 0,0014* (0,0007) 0,0009 (0,0009) 0,0008 (0,0010) 
 
                
Competition -0,0041** (0,0008) -0,0001 (0,0006) -0,0030** (0,0008) 0,0007 (0,0010) 
Spatial lags: Same language Different language Same language Different language Same language Different language Same language Different language 
Competition 0-15 min -0,0036** (0,0008) 0,0019** (0,0007) -0,0014** (0,0005) 0,0010 (0,0005) -0,0038** (0,0008) 0,0020** (0,0007) -0,0032** (0,0009) 0,0005 (0,0009) 
Competition 15-30 min -0,0011 (0,0011) 0,0005 (0,0008) 0,0006 (0,0006) 0,0003 (0,0006) -0,0007 (0,0011) 0,0005 (0,0008) 0,0011 (0,0010) 0,0014 (0,0011) 
Competition 30-45 min -0,0027* (0,0012) 0,0003 (0,0008) 0,0003 (0,0006) 0,0002 (0,0006) -0,0028* (0,0012) 0,0004 (0,0008) 0,0015 (0,0010) 0,0014 (0,0011) 
 
                
Diversity -0,0069 (0,0070) -0,0269** (0,0080) -0,0217** (0,0081) -0,0039 (0,0121) 
Spatial lags: Same language Different language Same language Different language Same language Different language Same language Different language 
Diversity 0-15 min 
-0,0091 (0,0089) 0,0188 (0,0233) -0,0103  (0,0103) 0,0141 
 
(0,0238) -0,0074 
 
(0,0103) 0,0135 
 
(0,0238) -0,0215 
 
(0,0155) 0,0297 
 
(0,0413) 
Diversity 15-30 min 
-0,0090 (0,0085) 0,0415** (0,0151) -0,0224*  (0,0100) 0,0472** 
 
(0,0159) -0,0211* 
 
(0,0100) 0,0463** 
 
(0,0159) -0,0121 
 
(0,0147) 0,0800** 
 
(0,0280) 
Diversity 30-45 min 
0,0018 (0,0085) 0,0309 (0,0213) -0,0038  (0,0093) 0,0356 
 
(0,0217) -0,0044 
 
(0,0093) 0,0362 
 
(0,0216) 0,0169 
 
(0,0144) -0,0293 
 
(0,0389) 
                 
Municipal-level variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment-level 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlack correction Yes Yes Yes No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No 
Deviance 121'462 121'390 121'503 354'587 
Observations 950'176; 2'362 municipalities; 545 sectors 950'176; 2'362 municipalities; 545 sectors 950'176; 2'362 municipalities; 545 sectors 475'088; 2'362 municipalities; 545 sectors 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; standard errors between parentheses 
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Additionally, possible problems of reverse causality are controlled for, by estimating firm 
employment growth between 2012 and 2013 and using as regressors information collected for the 
year 2011 (Model 4 in Table 3). Even when a temporal lag between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables is introduced, the results highlight that the spatial effects of specialization, 
competition and diversity differ depending on whether there exists a language border between the 
considered regions. 
2.6 Conclusions 
In the context of Switzerland the results of this study demonstrate that language, one particular 
dimension of culture, shapes the economic geography of agglomeration spillovers. These particular 
economic geography transmission mechanisms are mediated and altered by linguistic discontinuities 
and this, as far as the authors of this research are aware, has not been econometrically modeled or 
observed before. According to these results, specialization externalities are enhanced when firms are 
located close to municipalities with the same language, whereas competition and diversity 
externalities are reinforced when firms are located close to municipalities with different languages. 
All effects attenuate and then disappear after distances of between 15 and 30 minute travel times, 
depending on the particular effect. 
Exactly why these particular empirical results emerge is a different question which the authors 
have not sought to answer here. Localization economies tend to arise from the direct interaction 
among firms operating in the same sector and in the same area, and the results of this analysis suggest 
that linguistic differences may introduce an obstacle to more diffuse knowledge-interactions among 
firms operating in broadly the same field. On the other hand, these results suggest that linguistic 
differences, also partly reflecting cultural differences, may encourage knowledge interactions 
between more diverse groups of firms operating in different fields, in a manner largely reflecting the 
arguments of Jacobs (1969), although, at this stage these explanations can only be tentative and 
speculative and require further research. Importantly, and as already mentioned, in the case of 
Switzerland the various linguistic regions are clearly associated with different cultures (Hofstede 
2001), so these findings do appear to lend support to those who argue that culture affects the economy 
and economic geography in distinct ways. 
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Appendix 2.A – Agglomeration economies indices 
SPECIALIZATION (location quotient) 
𝑆𝑙𝑞 =  
𝐸𝑚𝑖 𝐸𝑚∗⁄
𝐸∗𝑖 𝐸∗∗⁄
 
COMPETITION (relative number of firms per employee) 
𝐶𝑟𝑓𝑝𝑒 =  
𝐹𝑚𝑖 𝐸𝑚𝑖⁄
𝐹∗𝑖 𝐸∗𝑖⁄
 
DIVERSITY (inverse Hirschman-Herfindhal index) 
𝐷 =  
[∑ (𝐸𝑚𝑖′ (𝐸𝑚∗ − 𝐸𝑚𝑖)⁄ )
2𝑆
𝑖=1,   𝑖′≠𝑖 ]
−1
[∑ (𝐸∗𝑖′ (𝐸∗∗ − 𝐸∗𝑖)⁄ )2
𝑆
𝑖=1,   𝑖′≠𝑖 ]
−1  
Where 𝐸𝑚𝑖 is employment in municipality 𝑚 and industry 𝑖, 𝐸𝑚∗ is employment in 
municipality 𝑚 and all industries, 𝐸∗𝑖 is employment in all municipalities and industry 𝑖, and 𝐸∗∗ is 
employment in all municipalities and all industries. 𝐹 stands for the number of firms. 
Indices used for the robustness checks 
SPECIALIZATION 
 Local industrial share 
𝑆𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 =  
𝐸𝑚𝑖
𝐸𝑚∗
 
COMPETITION 
 Absolute number of firms per employee 
𝐶𝑎𝑓𝑝𝑒 =  
𝐹𝑚𝑖
𝐸𝑚𝑖
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Appendix 2.B – Kernel density of distance between all 
municipalities and the closest city 
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Appendix 2.C – Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Employment growth 0 0,29 -5,41 5,57 
     
Specialization 4,02 34,39 0 6244,8 
Spatial lags same language:     
Specialization 0-15 min 1,21 2,18 0 473,49 
Specialization 15-30 min 1,09 0,99 0 163,24 
Specialization 30-45 min 1,06 1,03 0 202,92 
Spatial lags different language:     
Specialization 0-15 min 0,06 1,73 0 665,08 
Specialization 15-30 min 0,21 1,48 0 230,24 
Specialization 30-45 min 0,38 1,22 0 231,62 
 
    
Competition 2,02 3,67 0 328,28 
Spatial lags same language:     
Competition 0-15 min 1,5 1,53 0 154,3 
Competition 15-30 min 1,42 1,22 0 84,44 
Competition 30-45 min 1,43 1,09 0 92,97 
Spatial lags different language:     
Competition 0-15 min 0,08 0,89 0 149,52 
Competition 15-30 min 0,24 0,91 0 136,05 
Competition 30-45 min 0,49 1,17 0 105,38 
 
    
Diversity 0,33 0,16 0,01 0,71 
Spatial lags same language:     
Diversity 0-15 min 0,29 0,11 0 0,64 
Diversity 15-30 min 0,33 0,08 0 0,58 
Diversity 30-45 min 0,32 0,07 0 0,54 
Spatial lags different language:     
Diversity 0-15 min 0,01 0,05 0 0,69 
Diversity 15-30 min 0,04 0,1 0 0,69 
Diversity 30-45 min 0,1 0,15 0 0,55 
     
Observations 950'176; 2'362 municipalities; 545 sectors 
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Appendix 2.D – Correlation between agglomeration economies 
indices and their spatial lag 
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Appendix 2.E – Municipal level variables 
Demographic information 
Variable Definition Source 
Population Number of inhabitants Statistics of the 
population and 
households (STATPOP 
– FSO) 
Population growth Growth rate of number of inhabitants STATPOP – FSO 
Active population ratio Percentage of population between 20 
and 64 years old 
STATPOP – FSO 
Population density Inhabitants per square kilometer STATPOP – FSO 
Foreign population ratio Percentage of population without 
Swiss nationality 
STATPOP – FSO 
Net migration rate Difference between immigrants and 
emigrants divided per 1,000 
inhabitants 
STATPOP – FSO 
Socio-economic information 
Variable Definition Source 
Average income Average level of income Federal Tax 
Administration (FTA 
FSO) 
Unemployment rate Number of unemployed people 
divided per 100 inhabitant between 20 
and 64 years old. 
State Secretariat for 
Economic Affairs 
(SECO – FSO) 
Cross-border commuters 
ratio 
Number of cross-border commuters 
divided per 100 inhabitants 
Cross-border 
commuters statistics 
(CCS – FSO) 
Human capital (no post-
mandatory ) 
Percentage of population with no 
post-mandatory education in the year 
2000 [1] 
Federal Population 
Census (FSO) 
Human capital (post-
mandatory, no university) 
Percentage of population with post-
mandatory education without a 
university or equivalent degree in the 
year 2000 [1] (reference category) 
Federal Population 
Census (FSO) 
Human capital (university) Percentage of population with 
university or equivalent education 
level in the year 2000 [1] 
Federal Population 
Census (FSO) 
Level of taxation Municipal tax rate  FTA - FSO 
Social capital (voter 
turnout) 
Turnout for the federal election in 
2011  
Vote and elections 
statistics (FSO) 
Social capital (no profit 
employees ratio) 
Number of employees in NON 
PROFIT organization per inhabitant 
STATENT - FSO 
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Social capital (social 
assistance ratio) 
Percentage of population receiving 
social assistance 
Swiss statistics on 
social assistance 
recipients (FSO) 
Social capital (crime rate) Number of violations of the penal 
code per thousand inhabitants 
Statistics on convictions 
and persons serving 
prison sentences (FHE - 
FSO) 
Infrastructure investment 
Variable Definition Source 
Investment (supply of 
energy) 
Per capita level of investments in the 
construction of infrastructures related 
to the supply of energy 
Statistic of housing and 
construction (FSO) 
Investment (waste disposal) Per capita level of investments in the 
construction of infrastructures related 
to the waste disposal 
Statistic of housing and 
construction (FSO) 
Investment (road system) Per capita level of investments in the 
construction of road system 
Statistic of housing and 
construction (FSO) 
Investment (other 
transportation systems) 
Per capita level of investments in the 
construction of other transportation 
systems 
Statistic of housing and 
construction (FSO) 
Investment (education 
buildings) 
Per capita level of investments in the 
construction of buildings designed for 
educational and research activities 
Statistic of housing and 
construction (FSO) 
Investment (health care 
buildings) 
Per capita level of investments in the 
construction of buildings designed for 
health care system 
Statistic of housing and 
construction (FSO) 
Investment (culture and 
free time buildings) 
Per capita level of investments in the 
construction of buildings designed for 
leisure and free time activities 
Statistic of housing and 
construction (FSO) 
Investment (houses) Per capita level of investments in the 
construction of houses 
Statistic of housing and 
construction (FSO) 
Investment (agricultural 
buildings) 
Per capita level of investments in the 
construction of buildings designed for 
agricultural activities 
Statistic of housing and 
construction (FSO) 
Investment (industrial 
buildings) 
Per capita level of investments in the 
construction of buildings designed for 
industrial activities 
Statistic of housing and 
construction (FSO) 
Investment (other 
infrastructure) 
Per capita level of investments in the 
construction of other infrastructures 
Statistic of housing and 
construction (FSO) 
Infrastructure accessibility  
Variable Definition Source 
Distance nearest city Travel time distance between the 
centroid of each municipality and the 
centroid of the closest regional center 
[2] 
Federal Office for 
Spatial Development 
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Distance nearest highway 
ramp 
Travel time distance between the 
centroid of each municipality and the 
centroid of the closest municipality 
with a highway ramp 
Federal Office for 
Spatial Development 
Distance nearest train 
station 
Travel time distance between the 
centroid of each municipality and the 
centroid of the closest municipality 
with a railway station 
Federal Office for 
Spatial Development 
Distance nearest airport Travel time distance between the 
centroid of each municipality and the 
centroid of the closest municipality 
with one of the three main Swiss 
international airport 
Federal Office for 
Spatial Development 
Distance nearest custom Travel time distance between the 
centroid of each municipality and the 
centroid of the closest municipality 
with a custom 
Federal Office for 
Spatial Development 
Industrial area rate Ratio of industrial and commercial 
area divided by the total settlement 
and urban area 
GEOSTAT - FSO 
Demographic information 
Variable Definition Source 
German speaking ratio Percentage of population of having as 
mother tongue German [3] (reference 
category) 
Federal Population 
Census (FSO) 
French speaking ratio Percentage of population of having as 
mother tongue French [3] 
Federal Population 
Census (FSO) 
Italian speaking ratio Percentage of population of having as 
mother tongue Italian [3] 
Federal Population 
Census (FSO) 
Romansh speaking ratio Percentage of population of having as 
mother tongue Romansch [3] 
Federal Population 
Census (FSO) 
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3. Chapter 3: The geography of political ideologies in 
Switzerland26 
Daniele Mantegazzi, Rico Maggi 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, partisan-sorting forces and income-sorting processes are hypothesized to be 
interrelated phenomena leading to the clustering of people having similar levels of income and 
political ideologies. This paper determines the predominant political ideology of each Swiss 
municipality and examines whether there is any spatial concentration of political ideologies. The 
contribution of this research is that it proposes a new way to capture social interactions, based on the 
geographical concentration of political ideologies, and it shows that these concentrations are 
correlated with income and income inequality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: O18, O43, P48, R1 
Keywords: Political ideologies, Economic geography, Spatial cohesion, Geography of 
discontent. 
 
                                                 
26 This chapter is based on Mantegazzi and Maggi (2018), The geography of political ideologies in Switzerland. 
Presented at the 12th RSAI World Congress, Goa. Submitted to an international journal.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Geographical sorting processes are phenomena that many societies all over the world have 
been experiencing for centuries, usually leading to the clustering of population based on socio-
economic, religious or ethnic characteristics. Following the economic literature, individual income 
level plays an important role in sorting processes. On one hand, income could represent a constraint 
in the residential decision of people, as already formalized in the bid-rent theory (Fujita, 1989, based 
on the pioneering work of von Thünen, 1826 and Alonso, 1964), and, on the other hand, as already 
highlighted by Tiebout (1956), people prefer to live close to other people who are similar to 
themselves, also in terms of wealth. From an alternative perspective, in the political science literature 
there has been an increasing interest in the phenomenon of partisan sorting, which analyzes whether 
individuals are nowadays more geographically sorted according to their political preferences (Bishop, 
2008; Abramowitz, 2010; Abrams and Fiorina, 2012; Tam Cho et al., 2013). Moreover, the literature 
on voting behavior highlights how individual socio-economic characteristics are important predictor 
of political preferences (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2014). This implies that 
people sorting themselves based on socio-economic characteristics are also expected to share similar 
political ideologies. Hence, various sorting processes are hypothesized to cluster people with similar 
political preferences and analogous socio-economic characteristics. The clustering of people having 
similar political ideologies as well as similar levels of income links to recent findings on the 
importance of economic geography and regional differences in terms of economic welfare in 
explaining how people vote. The results of the Brexit referendum represent a key example, clearly 
showing that the level of local economy was an important driver, even after carefully controlling for 
individual characteristics (Los et al., 2017). This has led to the term “the geography of discontent”, 
referring to the spatial distribution of discontent in a country, reflecting inequalities between regions 
in terms of economic welfare (Los et al., 2017; Rodríguez-Pose, 2017; McCann, 2018). Hence, as 
already highlighted by O’Laughlin et al. (1994), the spatial dimension is extremely important and 
needs to be considered. 
The aim of this paper is to propose a new definition of spatial cohesion, representing a new 
way to capture social interactions, based on the geographical concentration of political ideologies. 
More specifically, this paper contribute to the existing literature by empirically identifying whether 
there is any spatial concentration of political ideologies in the context of Switzerland and determining 
the spatial extension of these concentrations. Moreover, this study analyzes whether this clustering 
of political preferences is correlated with income and income inequality. The analysis focuses on 
Switzerland, which represents a very interesting case because it practices a semi-direct democracy, 
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which allows having a rich dataset on many referenda, which is independent from short-term, 
candidate-related and party-related factors.  
Following Hermann and Leuthold (2003), this paper analyzes the results of 312 federal 
referenda between 1981 and 2017 at the municipal level. This study identifies Hermann and Leuthold 
(2003)’s three dimensions representing the Swiss political ideology space and expressing the 
following political beliefs: left vs. right, liberal vs. conservative and ecological vs. technocratic. 
Additionally, on each of these three dimensions, this paper empirically assesses the existence of 
spatial concentrations of Swiss municipalities sharing the same political ideology. This result is 
particularly interesting because it shows that the various sorting processes leading to the concentration 
of people sharing similar political preferences extend beyond municipal borders. Finally, based on 
these results, this research finds significant differences in the level of income and income inequality 
of Swiss municipalities, depending on their belonging to a political ideology cluster. This result 
contributes and further supports the findings and claims of other scholars, related to the concept of 
“the geography of discontent”, according to which economic geography is particularly important in 
understanding how people vote. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the related 
literature. The third and fourth sections describe the methodology and the database adopted for this 
research, respectively. In section five the results are presented and discussed, and the last section 
concludes. 
3.2 Literature review 
Clustering processes refer to the geographical aggregation of people, usually sharing a specific 
characteristic, and are often the result of spatial sorting phenomena. Spatial sorting refers to the 
redistribution of population groups into different neighborhoods in both urban and non-urban areas 
(Kawachi and Berkman, 2003) and is a key characteristic of many cities and nations across the world 
(Bailey et al., 2017). In fact, for centuries societies have been experiencing processes of spatial 
sorting, typically based on socio-economic, religious or ethnic characteristics. Economists, among 
others, have been studying this phenomenon for many decades. Already in the classic framework of 
the bid-rent theory (Alonso 1964; Beckman, 1969; Muth, 1969; Mills 1972 based on the pioneering 
work of von Thünen, 1826), as shown by Fujita (1989), the price for real estate, changing with the 
distance from the city center, shapes the residential choices of various income groups within a society, 
generating income sorting. In this setting, spatial sorting is the result of different willingness to pay 
for different income classes. Another growing body of literature in economics links sorting processes 
to social interactions (Schelling, 1971; Clark, 1991; Fossett, 2006), where residential decision are 
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driven by individual preferences for the neighborhood composition. In particular, people prefer to 
live in places in which other people are similar to themselves (McPherson et al., 2001; Musterd et al., 
2015). The idea that people with similar preferences cluster in particular municipalities is the focus 
of another important stream of literature in economics, which goes back to Tiebout (1956), where, in 
a fiscal decentralized setting, people sort themselves according to their preferences to achieve an 
efficient provision of local public goods. This model has then been extended to analyze the important 
role of differences in income in explaining sorting processes (Ellickson, 1971; Westhof, 1977; Ross 
and Yinger, 1999; Schmidheiny, 2006). Hence, various theoretical frameworks analyze and give 
possible explanations of those sorting processes which can be found in many contexts all over the 
world.  
From a slightly different perspective, in the political science literature, there has been a 
growing interest in the phenomenon of partisan sorting and there is currently a large debate on 
whether individuals are nowadays more sorted according to their political preferences. As highlighted 
by O’Laughlin et al. (1994), the spatial dimension is extremely important and needs to be considered 
in order to fully understand the political forces underlying this phenomenon. This is particularly 
relevant whenever the political power is partially decentralized (such as in a federal political system), 
given that various political institutions and political ideologies within the same country can generate 
different political contexts. Various studies find that, in the last decades, there has been an increase 
in the geographic polarization of voters (Kim et al., 2003; Bishop, 2008; Abramowitz, 2010; Wing 
and Walker, 2010; Tam Cho et al., 2013; Kinsella et al., 2015; Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2015). 
The potential causes of this geographic polarization of voters are partisan migration, generational 
replacement and the fact that parties are more polarized, making it easier for voters to identify 
themselves with a party (Vegetti et al, 2017). Bishop (2008) argues that a potential drawback of this 
sorting process is that homogeneous communities might encourage extremism by ignoring differing 
opinions. In contrast with these results, other authors find that voters are nowadays no more 
geographically sorted than in the past and relativize its importance (Glaeser and Ward, 2006; 
Levendusky and Pope, 2011; Abrams and Fiorina, 2012; Strickler, 2016). 
The vast majority of the studies analyzing the phenomenon of partisan sorting and polarization 
are based on presidential election in the US. As highlighted by Abrams and Fiorina (2012), data based 
on presidential elections are weak, because they are the result of short-term, candidate-related and 
party-related factors. Moreover, it is difficult to capture the complexity of the distribution of political 
ideologies with a single manifestation of the personal political preference, occurring only once every 
four years.  
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Additionally, the literature on voting behavior finds that socio-economic characteristics, such 
as income and the degree of income inequality, determine voting outcomes and are important 
predictors of party choice, at the individual level (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; McCarty et al., 2008, 
Rueda and Stegmueller, 2014).  
Hence, different sorting processes are, on one hand, hypothesized to group people sharing 
political preferences which are very much alike, and, on the other hand, cluster people with analogous 
socio-economic characteristics, in particular with similar levels of income.  At the same time, 
according to the literature on voting behavior, people sorting themselves based on socio-economic 
characteristics are also expected to share similar political ideologies. The implication is that partisan-
sorting forces and income-sorting processes are likely to be interrelated phenomena, leading to the 
clustering of people having similar levels of income and political ideologies. The hypothesis of 
clusters of people with similar political preferences as well as analogous levels of wealth links to 
recent findings on the importance of economic geography and regional differences in terms of 
economic welfare in explaining how people vote, in particular when the vote is used as a “mean of 
protest”. In particular, the results of the Brexit referendum, in which voters were asked whether they 
wished to leave or remain in the European Union, represent a key example, clearly showing that the 
level of local economy was an important driver (Los et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018; Crescenzi et al., 
2018). In fact, people in regions with lower levels of income who perceived to have suffered from 
modern globalization were more likely to vote “leave” than those from areas with higher levels of 
income (McCann, 2018). This has led to the term “the geography of discontent”, referring to the 
spatial distribution of discontent in a country, reflecting inequalities between regions in a country 
(Los et al., 2017; Rodríguez-Pose, 2017; McCann, 2018).  
This paper contributes to the existing literature by proposing a new definition of spatial 
cohesion, based on the geographical concentration of political ideologies. In particular, the aim of 
this research is to empirically identify whether there is any spatial concentration of political ideologies 
in the context of Switzerland in order to determine in a new way the existence of social interactions, 
and determine the spatial extension of these concentrations. Moreover, following the argument of 
“the geography of discontent”, this study analyzes whether this concentration is correlated with 
income and income inequality. 
Switzerland represents a very interesting case because it has strong institutions, it is a federal 
republic with highly decentralized political power and, at the same time, it practices a semi-direct 
democracy, in which Swiss citizens directly vote on various issues. More specifically, any 
constitutional change needs to be approved by a mandatory referendum. Furthermore, an optional 
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referendum can be demanded for any change in the Swiss law decided by the federal parliament27. 
Additionally, any Swiss citizen may propose a popular initiative to introduce amendments to the 
federal constitution28. The outcome of any vote is legally binding. Approximately, Swiss citizens vote 
four times a year and the most frequent topics on which they vote are healthcare, taxes, social welfare, 
drug policy, public transport, immigration, political asylum and education. The availability of 
referendum data allows overcoming the limitations of presidential election data mentioned above, 
and better determining the spectrum of political ideologies of voters. In particular, given that Swiss 
citizens directly express their opinion on various issues, the information available is independent from 
short-term, candidate-related and party-related factors. Moreover, the political preference is 
manifested several times every year. Hence, unlike the analyses on presidential elections or the Brexit 
referendum, this study simultaneously considers the results of several referenda, capturing the 
underlying long-term structure of political ideologies. 
3.3 Methodology 
The analysis presented in this study proceeds in three phases. The first step is to identify what 
is the political ideology of each municipality in Switzerland. Second, a spatial cluster analysis is 
performed in order to determine whether and where there is a significant geographical concentration 
of political ideologies. Finally, some tests are carried out to analyze whether the level of income and 
income inequality of municipalities belonging to different political ideology clusters are significantly 
different. 
The first task is to establish the political ideology of each municipality. To do so, this study 
follows Hermann and Leuthold (2001; 2003), by considering the federal referenda collected at the 
municipal level in Switzerland and performing an exploratory factor analysis on them. The underlying 
idea is that the referenda are the observed outcome of fewer independent and unobserved dimensions 
characterizing the political ideology space. This hypothesis is supported by qualitative and 
quantitative considerations related to the data used. In particular, from a qualitative perspective, 
several referenda concern the same (or at least very similar) topic. One can therefore expect that the 
outcome of referenda on similar topics are highly correlated because are driven by the same 
underlying political preference. Indeed, from a quantitative perspective, the distribution of referenda 
shows that they are spatially associated, indicating that the variance of the referenda exhibits similar 
                                                 
27 Any change to the Swiss law is subject to referendum if a minimum of 50’000 Swiss people have signed an official 
request to do so within 100 days. 
28 In the case of a federal popular initiative, a vote is organized if the promoter collects at least 100’000 signatures from 
Swiss people within 18 months. 
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patterns. In order to maximize the explained variance, the exploratory factor analysis is performed 
with VARIMAX-rotation. 
The results of the factor analysis allow extracting the statistical relationship among the 
referenda in order to determine the underlying unobserved factors. However, as highlighted by 
Hermann and Leuthold (2003), in order to meaningfully interpret them and identify the related 
ideological content, a qualitative interpretation of the specific political objects is needed. The 
combination of the factor analysis with the qualitative inspection of its results allows finding the 
dimensions representing the Swiss political ideology space. 
In the second step, in order to measure the degree of geographical concentration of the political 
ideology, a spatial cluster analysis is performed. Following Kim et al. (2003), Darmofal (2008), Wing 
and Walker (2010) and Kinsella et al. (2015), this study computes the vector of Local Moran’s I 
statistic (Moran, 1948; Cliff and Ord, 1981; Anselin, 1995) for each factor identified in the previous 
phase. The Local Moran’s I statistic associates a vector of observed values of a specific variable with 
a weighted average of the neighboring values and compares the real distribution with random spatial 
distributions, in order to capture significant spatial pattern. In particular, this analysis is able to 
establish whether a municipality has a significantly high (low) value on a specific factor and is 
surrounded by municipalities with high (low) values on the same factor, or whether the value of the 
municipality is not significantly high or low. Hence, this analysis allows determining if and where 
there is a significant geographical concentration of the different typologies of political ideologies 
identified with the previous step. 
Finally, the analysis focuses on empirically testing whether there is any evidence suggesting 
that there are significant differences in the level of income and income inequality of municipalities 
belonging to different typologies of political ideology clusters. The aim of this exercise is to verify 
the importance of economic geography in understanding how people vote within the Swiss context, 
by simultaneously considering the results of several referenda, capturing the underlying long-term 
structure of political ideologies. To do so, Kruskal-Wallis tests are performed (Kruskal and Wallis, 
1952). Similar to ANOVA, this test is used to verify whether the distribution of a specific variable is 
significantly different between more than two independent groups. However, differently from 
ANOVA, the Kruskal-Wallis test does not require the assumptions of homogeneity of variance 
between the groups and the normality of residuals. The result of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates 
whether there are significant differences among the groups, however, it does not provide information 
regarding which pairs of groups are significantly different. Hence, this final phase is extended by 
computing the Dunn’s test (Dunn, 1964), which is a post hoc pairwise multiple comparison suitable 
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to deepen the analysis after a rejection of the Kruskal-Wallis test. In order to account for the fact that 
multiple comparisons are conducted at the same time, Dunn’s tests are performed with the Benjamini-
Hochberg procedure (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). 
3.4 Data 
This research analyzes the results at the municipal level concerning all the 312 federal 
referenda between 1981 and 2017. This information is obtained from the section Politics, Culture and 
Media of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO)29. In particular, the factor analysis performed in 
order to identify the political ideology of each Swiss municipality is computed on the yes-share of all 
the 312 federal referenda considered30. In order to compare and combine the data in terms of geo-
political unit, all the referenda are based on the 2017 municipal definition of the FSO, which includes 
2240 municipalities.  
As explained above, the most frequent topics on which Swiss citizens vote are healthcare, 
taxes, social welfare, drug policy, public transport, immigration, political asylum and education. In 
order to capture changes in the political ideology of each municipality through time, the factor 
analysis is computed on different time-subsamples of the whole dataset. In particular, the first 
subsample considers all the 65 referenda between 1981 and 1990, the second subsample takes into 
account all the 106 referenda between 1991 and 2000; the third one contains all the 82 referenda 
between 2001 and 2010, and the fourth subsample considers all the 59 referenda between 2011 and 
2017. As the results show, given that the Swiss population periodically votes on the same topics, the 
factor analyses computed over different time-subsamples generate factors which are built in a very 
similar way, allowing comparing the results from different periods. 
To perform spatial analyses, there exist different specification of the spatial dependence 
matrix, 𝑊. In order to take into consideration the impact of the extremely uneven topographical 
context of Switzerland31 on the actual distance between two municipalities, this study considers a 
spatial weight matrix based on the inverse travel time between the centroids of the municipalities. 
Travel time data are provided by the Swiss Federal Office for Spatial Development and consider the 
trip by car in minutes. To keep the spatial analysis at a local level, after examining the distribution of 
distances between Swiss municipalities, a cutoff is imposed at a distance of 20 minutes travel time. 
                                                 
29 It is possible to download the municipal-level results of Swiss referenda at the following webpage: 
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/politik/abstimmungen/stimmbeteiligung.assetdetail.3362356.html  
30 The factor analysis is able to account for the fact that the wording of referenda on similar topics could be inconsistent, 
by giving positive or negative factor loadings. 
31 Switzerland is characterized by flat areas and regions with very high mountains. 
73 
Moreover, following the spatial econometric literature (Anselin, 1988; Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; 
LeSage and Pace, 2009), the 𝑊 matrix has been standardized, such that each row sums to unity. 
In the final part of this research, the aim is to test whether there are significant differences in 
the economic welfare level of municipalities belonging to different typologies of political ideology 
clusters. In particular, this study considers the median income and the Gini coefficient of the income 
distribution of each municipality. All these variables are obtained from the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration. The analysis is done for each of the four time-subsample and the reference year for 
the economic welfare variable is the first year of the considered period32. 
3.5 Results and discussion 
This section first presents the results of the exploratory factor analysis and describes the 
identified dimensions of the political ideology space. Subsequently, the results of the spatial cluster 
analysis are shown. Finally, the discussion ends focusing on the results of the tests, which aim at 
verifying whether there are significant differences in the income level and income distribution of 
municipalities belonging to different typologies of political ideology clusters. 
Factor analysis 
In order to be consistent with the existing literature on the identification of the Swiss political 
ideology structure, this study follows Hermann and Leuthold (2003) and performs a factor analysis33 
for each period identifying the same three unobserved factors they found. These three factors are able 
to capture between 55 and 60% of the overall variance of all the referenda, depending on the period 
considered. This indicates that the majority of political ideologies in Switzerland can be represented 
by three main dimensions. In order to give a meaningful interpretation to the resulting factors, the 
analysis considers from a qualitative perspective the ideological content of the referenda building 
them.34 
Considering the most important referenda building factor 1 in the period 1981-1990, factor 3 
in the period 1991-2000, factor 2 in the decade 2001-2010 and factor 1 in the period 2011-2017, it 
emerges that they are based on topics related to the protection of the workforce (e.g. the popular 
initiative on shortening working hours in 1988, the popular initiative for a flexible retirement age in 
2000, or the popular initiative for a minimum wage in 2014), the welfare state (such as the amendment 
to the federal law on aged and bereaved insurance in 1995, the popular initiative “Health has to be 
                                                 
32 For the third period, data on median income and Gini coefficients are not available for the year 2001. Hence, 
information for the year 2003 are used instead. 
33 The results of the factor analysis are reported in Appendix 2.A. 
34 The final factors are built considering all the votes whit a factor loading of at least 0.5 (in absolute terms). 
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affordable” in 2003, or the popular initiative for a basic income in 2016), and the national security 
policy (for example the popular initiative for a Switzerland without army and a comprehensive policy 
of peace in 1989, the popular initiative for a voluntary civilian peace service in 2001, or the popular 
initiative on the abolition of compulsory military service in 2013). Hence, as in Hermann and 
Leuthold (2003), these factors represent the “Left-Right” dimension of the political ideology space. 
In particular, these factors are capturing the debate between those who are in favor of the welfare 
state, the protection of the workforce, personal freedom and pacifism on one hand (i.e. with a left-
wing perspective), and on the other hand those that have more propriety-oriented values, support the 
military strength and entrepreneurial freedom (i.e. with a right-wing perspective). 
A different dimension of the political ideology structure of Switzerland is represented by 
factor 3 in the decade 1981-1990, factor 1 in the period 1991-2000, factor 1 in the decade 2001-2010 
and factor 2 in the period 2011-2017. Analyzing the main referenda contributing to the construction 
of these factors, it appears that they link to topics related to foreign integration (such as the federal 
decree for a review of the procedure for naturalizing young immigrants in 1994, the popular initiative 
against the construction of new minarets in 2009, or the popular initiative against mass immigration 
in 2014), liberal economic policies (e.g. the federal decree on joining Bretton Woods in 1992, the 
popular initiative for Switzerland to join the United Nations in 2002, or the federal decree on 
extending the agreement on free movement of people to new countries of the European Union in 
2005), and regulatory modernization (for example the federal law on government and administrative 
organization in 1996, the federal decree on a new Swiss Federal Constitution in 1999, or the federal 
decree on the non-introduction of public initiatives in 2009). Also in this case, the results are in line 
with those of Hermann and Leuthold (2003), in fact, these factors express the “Liberal-Conservative” 
dimension of the political ideology space. In particular, this dimension is representing the debate 
between those who support the opening of the country, are in favor of liberal economic policies and 
the modernization of institutions (i.e. with a liberal attitude), and those who are more skeptical 
towards changes and the opening of the country, prefer to preserve the existing regulations and 
mistrust the political and economic elites (i.e. with a conservative attitude). 
Finally, the third dimension of the Swiss political ideology space is captured by factor 2 in the 
decades 1981-1990 and 1991-2000, and factor 3 in the periods 2001-2010 and 2011-2017. This 
dimension is based on topics related to traffic (e.g. the popular initiative “Stop the concrete - for a 
limitation on road making” in 1990, the popular initiative for the protection of the alpine region from 
traffic in 1994, or the popular initiative on lowering the urban speed limit to 30 km/h in 2001), and 
environmental protection (such as the federal decree on varying tolls based on engine power or 
mileage in 1994, the federal decree on providing enhanced legal protection for animals in 2010, or 
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the popular initiative for the introduction of a tax on non-renewable energy in 2015). These factors 
represent the “Ecological-Technocratic” dimension identified by Hermann and Leuthold (2003). 
More specifically, this dimension expresses the debate between those who support the protection of 
the natural environment and are in favor of policies reducing the negative impact of human activities 
on nature (i.e. with an ecological attitude), and those who believe that the natural environment should 
be transformed to create more security and comfort, and used to generate technological progress (i.e. 
with a technocratic attitude). 
The results of the factor analysis show that the political ideology of Swiss municipalities can 
be represented in a three-dimensional space, in which the three independent axes express the 
following political debates: left vs. right, liberal vs. conservative and ecological vs. technocratic. 
Figure 3.1 shows the political ideology position of Swiss municipalities on two of these three 
dimensions, for each considered period. In particular, the horizontal axis expresses the “Left-Right” 
dimension, while the vertical axis maps the position of each municipality on the “Liberal-
Conservative” dimension35. Each dot represents a municipality, and the size of the dots indicates the 
dimension of the municipality, in terms of inhabitants in the first year of the considered period. The 
red lines show the overall national position on these two dimensions. This graphical representation 
allows highlighting the following two remarks. Firstly, in the first two decades the positions of Swiss 
municipalities are spread on all four quadrants, however, in the last two periods (in particular in the 
last one) the political ideology positions of Swiss municipalities are mainly concentrated in the “Left-
Liberal” and “Right-Conservative” quadrants. Hence, this first graphical representation highlights a 
phenomenon of increasing polarization that is characterizing the Swiss political ideology space. 
Moreover, to better capture political preferences and the underlying political forces, it is important to 
consider more than a single political dimension, which, additionally, should be independent from 
short-term, candidate-related and party-related factors. Secondly, by simultaneously taking into 
considerations both these dimensions and the size of each municipality, in terms of number of 
inhabitants, it emerges that the position on the political ideology space is also a manifestation of the 
rural-urban divide. In fact, in line with Hermann and Leuthold (2003), cities and bigger municipalities 
are mainly positioned in the “Left-Liberal” quadrant, while smaller and rural communes are mainly 
found in the “Right-Conservative” quadrant. 
 
                                                 
35 The two-dimensional graphical representation is preferred to the three-dimensional one because easier to interpret. 
The choice of the two dimensions to consider is based on their importance in explaining the overall variance of political 
preferences, as indicated from the results of the factor analysis. 
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Figure 3.1 – The political ideology position of Swiss municipalities 
 
The identification of the political ideology of Swiss municipalities allows continuing the 
analysis with spatial cluster methods in order to empirically assess the degree of geographical 
concentration of political ideologies. 
Spatial cluster analysis (Local Moran’s I) 
Following Kim et al. (2003), Darmofal (2008), Wing and Walker (2010) and Kinsella et al. 
(2015), the second phase of this analysis applies spatial cluster analysis to identify whether and where 
the political ideologies of Swiss municipalities are geographically concentrated. In particular, local 
Moran’s I statistics for each of the three dimensions determined with the factor analysis are computed 
and then plotted in order to visualize the spatial pattern of significant concentration of political 
ideologies. 
Figure 3.2 plots the results of the local Moran’s I statistics for the “Left-Right” dimension as 
a set of significance maps for the four different periods. Municipalities exhibiting significant spatial 
clustering of the right-wing political ideology are shown in blue, while those belonging to a 
significant geographical concentration of the left-wing political ideology are colored in red. This 
graphical visualization clearly illustrates that the “Left-Right” dimension of the Swiss political 
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ideology space is characterized by geographical concentrations of municipalities with similar political 
preferences. More specifically, in line with the results of Hermann and Leuthold (2003), right-wing 
municipalities are predominantly clustered in the rural areas of the German speaking part of 
Switzerland, i.e. the center and north-east parts.  
Figure 3.2 - Local Moran's I statistics for the Left-Right dimension 
 
Additionally, left-wing municipalities are mainly concentrated in the Italian and French 
speaking part of Switzerland, i.e. in the south and in the west parts, respectively. The results also 
show that through time there has been some minor changes. More specifically, the geographical 
concentrations of right-wing municipalities are increasing in the central part of Switzerland, while 
the ones concerning left-wing municipalities are increasing in the western part of Switzerland and 
decreasing in the south, after an increase in the second period. 
The results concerning the spatial cluster analysis on the “Liberal-Conservative” dimension 
of the Swiss political ideology space are shown in Figure 3.3. In this case, municipalities marked in 
blue belong to significant geographical concentrations of communes with a liberal political 
preference, while those colored in red are municipalities exhibiting significant spatial clustering of 
the conservative political ideology. The first consideration emerging from this graphical visualization 
is that geographical concentrations of political ideologies occurs also on the “Liberal-Conservative” 
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dimension. More specifically, liberal municipalities are mainly clustered around the Swiss central-
western cities and in the French speaking part of Switzerland. On the other side, the conservative 
municipalities are mainly concentrated in the rural areas of the German and Italian speaking parts of 
Switzerland, i.e. in the east and in the south-east, respectively. 
Figure 3.3 - Local Moran's I statistics for the Liberal-Conservative dimension 
 
Considering the temporal evolution of the geographical concentrations of political ideologies 
along the “Liberal-Conservative” dimension, it clearly emerges that the first decade shows different 
patterns than the other three periods. As highlighted by Hermann and Leuthold (2003), this can be 
explained by the fact that the debate between liberals and conservatives in Switzerland became 
significantly important at the beginning of the nineties, when the discussion concerning the 
relationship between Switzerland and Europe started.  
Finally, Figure 3.4 maps the results of the cluster analysis on the “Ecological-Technocratic” 
dimension of the Swiss political ideology space. Municipalities belonging to a significant 
geographical concentration of the ecological political ideology are colored in blue, while communes 
exhibiting significant spatial clustering of the technocratic political ideology are marked in red. Even 
in this case the results show that there are geographical concentrations of municipalities with similar 
political preferences. Ecological municipalities are mainly concentrated close to the big cities of the 
German speaking part of Switzerland (i.e. in the center and north-east parts) and in the rural areas in 
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the east and south-east. On the contrary, technocratic communes are predominantly clustered in the 
rural areas of the French speaking part of Switzerland (i.e. in the west). The temporal perspective 
allows determining that the geographical concentrations of ecological municipalities have decreased, 
in particular in the rural areas in the east and south-east part of Switzerland. Moreover, the spatial 
concentrations of technocratic municipalities have increased in the south, but diminished in the north-
west. 
Figure 3.4 - Local Moran's I statistics for the Ecological-Technocratic dimension 
 
Overall, the results of the spatial cluster analysis highlight that along all the three dimensions 
characterizing the Swiss political ideology space there are geographical concentrations of 
municipalities with similar political preferences. The geographical representations of these results 
show that the “Left-Right” dimension is characterized by many and wider clusters, while the “Liberal-
Conservative” dimension is defined by fewer and narrower concentrations. Hence, it seems that there 
are stronger sorting and polarizing effects along the “Left-Right” axes and weaker along the “Liberal-
Conservative” one, with the dimension related to the “Ecological-Technocratic” debate somewhere 
in between. These results are particularly interesting because they show that social interactions, 
captured as the geographical concentration of political ideologies, extend beyond municipal borders 
and further support the importance of analyzing these clusters. 
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Kruskal-Wallis and Dunn tests 
The results discussed above indicate that Switzerland is characterized by geographical 
concentrations of political ideologies along various dimensions. As mentioned above, partisan-sorting 
processes are expected to be interrelated with income-sorting processes, implying that these 
phenomena are likely to lead to the clustering of people having similar levels of income and political 
ideologies. This hypothesis is also supported by the literature on voting behavior (Meltzer and 
Richard, 1981; McCarty et al., 2008, Rueda and Stegmueller, 2014) as well as the one on “the 
geography of discontent” (Los et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018; Crescenzi et al., 2018). Hence, the final 
phase of this analysis aims at empirically verifying whether there are differences in economic welfare 
among municipalities belonging to different clusters of political ideologies. In particular, Kruskal-
Wallis tests are performed on the median income and the Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
of each municipality, to verify whether the distribution of these variables are significantly different 
among municipalities belonging to different aggregations of political ideologies and that do not 
belong to any cluster. These tests are carried out for each dimension of the Swiss political ideology 
space and for each period previously considered, separately, and are reported in Table 3.1, Table 3.2 
and Table 3.3, along with the median value of the considered variables for each cluster of 
municipalities. Additionally, Dunn’s tests are performed in order to exactly identify which pairs of 
groups are significantly different. Given that multiple tests are carried out at the same time, these tests 
are corrected with the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure36.  
Table 3.1 – Results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests on the “Left-Right” dimension 
 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 2011-2017 
Median income 𝜒2(2) = 55.1 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 125.3 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 0.8 
p = 0.66 
𝜒2(2) = 62.8 
p < 0.001 
Median “Left” 
Median “Not Significant” 
Median “Right” 
32’500 CHF 
34’000 CHF 
32’250 CHF 
44’350 CHF 
48’050 CHF 
48’500 CHF 
54’967 CHF 
56’000 CHF 
55’925 CHF 
61’800 CHF 
59’550 CHF 
56’600 CHF 
Gini coefficient of the 
income distribution 
𝜒2(2) = 75.1 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 23.6 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 11.3 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 113.0 
p < 0.001 
Median “Left” 
Median “Not Significant” 
Median “Right” 
0.317 
0.308 
0.290 
0.329 
0.316 
0.318 
0.316 
0.310 
0.310 
0.360 
0.336 
0.328 
     
Considering the “Left-Right” dimension, the results, as reported in Table 3.1 and in Tables 
B.1 and B.2 of Appendix 3.B, indicate that the clusters of left-wing and right-wing municipalities are 
                                                 
36 The results of the Dunn’s tests are reported in Appendix 3.B, along with the median value of the considered variables 
for each group of municipalities and for each period. 
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characterized by significant differences in the distributions of both median income and the Gini 
coefficient of the income distribution, with the exception of the decade 2001-2010 for median income. 
By taking into account the median income for each cluster, it is not possible to find a clear 
pattern showing which cluster of political ideology is associated with higher (lower) values of median 
income in the four considered periods. On the other hand, the results indicate that municipalities 
belonging to a geographical concentration of a left-wing political ideology are characterized by a 
significantly higher Gini coefficient of income distribution, when compared to those with a right-
wing political ideology, showing that there is a higher demand for left-wing policies where there are 
higher degrees of income inequality. Hence, these findings indicate that groups of municipalities with 
a significant left-wing ideology are characterized by significantly higher degrees of income 
inequality, in line with the findings of the literature on voting behavior (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; 
McCarty et al., 2008, Rueda and Stegmueller, 2014). 
Table 3.2 – Results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests on the “Liberal-Conservative” dimension 
 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 2011-2017 
Median income 𝜒2(2) = 105.0 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 97.4 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 335.6 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 314.1 
p < 0.001 
Median “Conservative” 
Median “Not Significant” 
Median “Liberal” 
30’775 CHF 
33’600 CHF 
34’850 CHF 
45’650 CHF 
47’125 CHF 
50’050 CHF 
52’200 CHF 
55’800 CHF 
62’500 CHF 
54’200 CHF 
59’150 CHF 
68’400 CHF 
Gini coefficient of the 
income distribution 
𝜒2(2) = 157.9 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 140.5 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 120.0 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 203.0 
p < 0.001 
Median “Conservative” 
Median “Not Significant” 
Median “Liberal” 
0.279 
0.304 
0.335 
0.304 
0.322 
0.338 
0.297 
0.311 
0.331 
0.317 
0.337 
0.371 
     
Focusing the attention to the “Liberal-Conservative” dimension, the results, as indicated in 
Table 3.2 and in Tables B.3 and B.4 of Appendix 3.B, show that among the clusters of liberal and 
conservative municipalities there always are significant differences in the distributions of both 
median income and the Gini coefficient of the income distribution.  
Moreover, both the median income and the Gini coefficient of the income distribution in 
clusters of liberal municipalities are in each period significantly higher than those of municipalities 
that do not belong to any cluster, along this dimension, and even higher than those of municipalities 
linked to a conservative cluster. Therefore, these results show that clusters of municipalities with a 
significant liberal ideology are characterized by significantly higher levels of economic welfare as 
well as significantly higher degrees of income inequality. 
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Finally, considering the “Ecological-Technocratic” axis of the Swiss political ideology space, 
the results, as reported in Table 3.3 and in Tables B.5 and B.6 of Appendix 3.B, indicate that the 
clusters of ecological and technocratic municipalities are characterized by significant differences in 
the distributions of both median income and the Gini coefficient of the income distribution.  
Table 3.3 – Results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests on the “Ecological-Technocratic” dimension 
 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 2011-2017 
Median income 𝜒2(2) = 31.1 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 13.7 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 58.3 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 7.1 
p =0.03 
Median “Ecological” 
Median “Not Significant” 
Median “Technocratic” 
34’700 CHF 
33’050 CHF 
33’117 CHF 
48’000 CHF 
47’400 CHF 
45’938 CHF 
58’000 CHF 
55’925 CHF 
53’150 CHF 
58’400 CHF 
59’400 CHF 
60’300 CHF 
Gini coefficient of the 
income distribution 
𝜒2(2) = 26.9 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 128.7 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 37.0 
p < 0.001 
𝜒2(2) = 195.9 
p < 0.001 
Median “Ecological” 
Median “Not Significant” 
Median “Technocratic” 
0.311 
0.302 
0.315 
0.343 
0.313 
0.318 
0.323 
0.308 
0.307 
0.327 
0.333 
0.373 
     
In addition, both the median income and the Gini coefficient of the income distribution in 
clusters of ecological municipalities are significantly higher than those of municipalities belonging 
to a technocratic cluster, with the exception of the last period, which, interestingly, shows opposite 
results. Hence, between 1981 and 2010, clusters of municipalities with a significant ecological 
ideology are characterized by significantly higher levels of economic welfare as well as significantly 
higher degrees of income inequality. However, in the period 2011-2017 the reverse is true, i.e. clusters 
of municipalities with a significant technocratic ideology have a significantly higher median income 
as well as significantly higher degrees of income inequality. 
Overall, these results clearly indicate that there are significant differences in the level of 
income and income inequality of Swiss municipalities, depending on their belonging to a political 
ideology cluster. These findings seem to support the hypothesis that partisan-sorting processes are 
interrelated with income-sorting processes and further support the findings and claims of other 
scholars, arguing that economic geography is particularly important in understanding how people 
vote 
3.6 Conclusions 
This paper proposes a new definition of spatial cohesion, based on the geographical 
concentration of political ideologies, which represents a new way to capture social interactions. The 
application of spatial cluster analysis empirically assesses the existence of spatial concentrations of 
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Swiss municipalities sharing the same political ideology. This first result is particularly interesting 
because it shows that social interactions, captured as the geographical concentration of political 
ideologies, extend beyond municipal borders and further supports the importance of analyzing these 
clusters. Moreover, this result is valid for all the three main dimensions characterizing the Swiss 
political ideology space, expressing the following political beliefs: left vs. right, liberal vs. 
conservative and ecological vs. technocratic. Additionally, these findings seems to indicate that there 
are stronger clustering effects along the “Left-Right” axes and relatively weaker along the “Liberal-
Conservative” one. 
Moreover, a second important finding of this paper indicates that the geographical distribution 
of the clusters of political ideologies are also a manifestation of the rural-urban divide as well as the 
cultural divides among the different linguistic regions of Switzerland. In particular, geographical 
concentrations of left-wing municipalities are mainly located close to cities and in the French and 
Italian speaking parts of Switzerland, while clusters of right-wing municipalities are predominantly 
found in rural areas and in the German speaking part of Switzerland. At the same time, spatial 
concentrations of liberal municipalities are mostly situated close to cities and in the French speaking 
part of Switzerland, whereas clusters of conservative communes are mainly located in rural areas and 
in the German and Italian speaking regions of Switzerland. Additionally, clusters of ecological 
municipalities are predominantly found around cities and in the German speaking part of Switzerland, 
while agglomerations of technocratic communes are mostly located in rural areas and in the French 
speaking region of Switzerland. Moreover, the evolution of such divides between 1981 and 2017 
seems to suggest that the Swiss political ideology space is characterized by a phenomenon of 
increasing polarization. 
Thirdly, this study finds significant differences in income levels and income inequalities 
among Swiss municipalities, depending on their belonging to a political ideology cluster. More 
specifically, clusters of left-wing municipalities are characterized by significantly higher degrees of 
income inequality, when compared to aggregations of right-wing municipalities. At the same time, 
the results indicate that clusters of liberal communes have a significantly higher median income and 
a higher degree of income inequality, compared to concentrations of conservative municipalities. 
Moreover, with the exception of the period 2011-2017, clusters of ecological communes have a 
significantly higher median income and a higher degree of income inequality, compared to 
concentrations of technocratic municipalities. 
Hence, these findings indicate that clusters of communes with a similar political ideology 
group either urban municipalities with relatively high levels of income and high degrees of inequality 
84 
(as in the cases of left, liberal or ecological clusters) or rural communes with relatively low levels of 
income and low degrees of inequality (for the cases of right, technocratic or conservative clusters). 
Interestingly, the empirical evidence does not show any political ideology clustering of “privileged” 
communes (i.e. with high levels of income and low degrees of inequality), nor “left-behind” 
municipalities (i.e. with low levels of income and high degrees of inequality). 
In conclusion, besides identifying the political preference of Swiss municipalities, these 
results highlight the importance of the geography of these political ideologies, and, in particular, of 
their spatial concentration. This result contributes and further supports the findings and claims of the 
literature on “the geography of discontent”, according to which economic geography is particularly 
important in understanding how people vote. These findings are particularly interesting because they 
emerge from a study simultaneously considering the results of several referenda, capturing the 
underlying long-term structure of political ideologies, which is independent from short-term, 
candidate-related and party-related factors. The existence of differences in economic welfare among 
municipalities belonging to different clusters of political ideologies implies that future research 
should consider this new definition of spatial cohesion in order to understand how and why different 
concentrations of political preferences are associated to different levels of welfare. 
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Appendix 3.A – Results of the factor analyses 
Table A.1: Factor scores for the period 1981-1990 
Vote Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Federal decree on the popular initiative for gender equality 
(counter-proposal) 
0,72 0,31 0,2 
Federal decree on the popular initiative the protection of 
consumer rights (counter-proposal) 
0,67 -0,13 0,36 
Federal decree on prolonging the federal finance order 0,01 0,01 0,62 
New federal law on foreigners -0,42 -0,05 0,39 
Amendment to the Swiss penal code 0,2 -0,43 0,49 
Popular initiative for the prevention of abusive prices 0,76 0,24 -0,06 
Federal decree on the popular initiative for the prevention of 
abusive prices (counter-proposal) 
-0,47 0,11 0,22 
Federal decree on changes to fuel tax 0,36 -0,1 0,58 
Federal decree on the constitutional article on energy 0,18 -0,4 0,28 
Federal decree on the revision of nationality law in the 
Federal Constitution 
0,18 -0,08 0,67 
Federal decree aiming at facilitating certain naturalizations 0,21 -0,14 0,49 
Federal decree on introducing tolls for heavy goods vehicles -0,07 0,71 0,24 
Federal decree on introducing tolls for national routes 0,21 0,62 0,41 
Popular initiative for a real civilian service based on a proof 
through demonstration 
0,79 0,06 0,17 
Popular initiative against the abuse of bank client 
confidentiality and bank power 
-0,15 0,8 0,03 
Popular initiative against slashing the national soil 0,15 0,67 0,05 
Popular initiative for a future without further nuclear power 
plants 
0,62 0,09 -0,05 
Popular initiative for a secure, parsimonious and ecologically 
sound energy supply 
0,59 0,09 -0,12 
Popular initiative for an effective protection of maternity 0,05 0,55 0,57 
Federal decree on the constitutional article on broadcasting 0,29 0,11 0,76 
Popular initiative for the compensation of victims of violent 
crimes 
0,76 -0,17 0,11 
Federal decree on abolishing primary school fees -0,31 0,17 0,78 
Federal decree on abolishing the government contribution to 
healthcare spending 
-0,35 0,07 0,76 
Federal decree on education fees 0,84 0,01 -0,08 
Popular initiative on extending paid leave -0,48 0,01 0,59 
Popular initiative "right to life" -0,11 0,34 0,74 
Federal decree on abolishing the cantonal share of profits 
from banks' stamp duty 
-0,02 0,28 0,76 
Federal decree on the taxation raised from the sale of spirits -0,07 -0,07 -0,41 
Federal decree on the abolition of grants for the self-supply of 
breadstuffs 
0,43 -0,38 0,5 
Federal decree on the popular initiative to co-ordinate the start 
of the school year (counter-proposal) 
0,78 -0,22 0,32 
Federal decree on giving small and medium enterprises an 
advantage in cases of innovations 
0,78 -0,25 0,16 
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Amendments to the Swiss Civil Code 0,51 -0,51 0,11 
Popular initiative to ban vivisection 0,07 0,66 0,24 
Federal decree on joining the United Nations 0,68 -0,03 0,43 
Popular initiative on culture 0,18 0,16 0,3 
Federal decree on the popular initiative on culture (counter-
proposal) 
0,62 0 -0,04 
Popular initiative on vocational education 0,68 -0,15 0,09 
Federal decree on the domestic sugar economy -0,34 -0,51 -0,09 
Federal decree on the popular initiative for the protection of 
tenants (counter-proposal) 
0,42 0,58 0,38 
Popular initiative for a just taxation of truck traffic 0,62 0,22 0,24 
Amendments to the federal law on asylum 0,75 0,16 -0,17 
Federal law on the residence and settlement of foreigners 0,67 0,14 0,42 
Popular initiative for the people's co-determination of military 
expenditure 
-0,36 0,08 0,12 
Federal decree on the voting system for popular initiatives -0,19 0,04 0,29 
Federal decree on the Rail 2000 project 0,56 0,39 -0,06 
Popular initiative for the protection of fens 0,59 0,17 0,26 
Amendment to the federal law on health insurance 0,45 -0,07 0,41 
Federal decree on the constitutional principles behind a 
coordinated transport policy 
0,2 0,66 0,4 
Popular initiative on lowering the retirement age to 62 for 
men and 60 for women 
0,84 -0,02 -0,06 
Popular initiative against real estate speculation 0,19 0,47 -0,25 
Popular initiative for the shortening of labor time 0,57 0,38 0,06 
Popular initiative for limiting immigration 0,85 0,08 0 
Popular initiative for nature-oriented farming and against 
animal factories 
0,34 0,73 0,08 
Popular initiative for a Switzerland without army and a 
comprehensive policy of peace 
0,75 -0,04 0 
Popular initiative on introducing 130 and 100 kilometers per 
hour speed limits 
0,27 -0,78 -0,16 
Popular initiative "Stop the concrete - for a limitation on road 
making" 
-0,05 0,91 0,02 
Popular initiative for a highway-free countryside between 
Murten and Yverdon 
-0,11 0,91 0 
Popular initiative for a highway-free Knonauer Amt -0,02 0,87 -0,01 
Popular initiative for a highway-free area between Biel and 
Solothurn/Zuchwil 
0,1 0,85 0,01 
Federal decree on viticulture -0,29 -0,37 0,51 
Amendment to the federal law on the organization of the 
federal judiciary 
-0,11 -0,67 0,11 
Popular initiative to phase out nuclear power 0,61 0,27 -0,05 
Popular initiative to stop the construction of any new nuclear 
power plants 
0,52 0,27 0,28 
Federal decree on the constitutional article on energy 0,69 0,1 -0,05 
Amendment to the federal law on road traffic -0,06 -0,78 0,15 
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Table A.2: Factor scores for the period 1991-2000 
Vote Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Federal decree on lowering the voting age to 18 0,04 0,74 -0,04 
Popular initiative on promoting public transport 0,48 0,08 -0,15 
Federal decree on reorganizing the federal finances 0,08 0,62 0,26 
Amendment to the military penal code 0 0,35 0,44 
Popular initiative for a financially bearable health insurance -0,17 0,73 0,21 
Popular initiative for the drastic and stepwise limitation of 
animal experiments 
-0,38 0,49 -0,26 
Federal decree on joining the Bretton Woods system 0,12 0,76 -0,07 
Federal law on contributing to the Bretton Woods system 0,17 0,72 0,09 
Federal law on water protection 0,23 0,67 0,2 
Federal decree on the popular initiative against the 
malpractice of gene technology on humans (counter-proposal) 
0,32 0,61 0,2 
Federal decree on creating a civilian service alternative to 
military service  
0,46 0,6 0,02 
Amendments to the Swiss Penal Code and the Military Penal 
Code on sexual integrity 
0,86 -0,05 -0,08 
Popular initiative for the recovery of our waters 0,86 -0,07 -0,1 
Federal decree on building a transalpine rail route -0,14 0,58 0,09 
Federal law on the standing orders of the Federal Assembly 0,62 0,42 -0,12 
Amendment to the stamp duty law 0,69 0,32 -0,18 
Federal law on farmland 0,82 0,23 -0,14 
Federal law on the expenses of members of the Federal 
Assembly 
0,65 -0,04 0,12 
Federal law on the salaries of members of the Federal 
Assembly 
0,64 -0,07 -0,23 
Federal decree on the European Economic Area 0,84 -0,34 -0,26 
Federal law to raise fuel taxes -0,17 0,69 -0,11 
Federal decree on lifting the ban on gambling establishments -0,15 0,63 0,52 
Popular initiative on banning animal testing 0,35 -0,01 0,04 
Popular initiative "40 military training areas are enough-
environment projection at military" 
0,4 0,2 -0,67 
Popular initiative for a Switzerland without new warplanes 0,43 0,17 -0,68 
Federal decree on the misuse of weaponry 0,06 0,47 -0,17 
Federal decree on whether Laufen should be part of the Basel-
Landschaft canton 
0,64 0,25 -0,1 
Popular initiative on creating a new Swiss National Day on 1 
August 
0,36 0,15 0,39 
Federal decree on a temporary halt to increase in the cost of 
health insurance 
0,4 0,02 0,34 
Federal decree on unemployment insurance 0,56 -0,22 -0,29 
Federal decree on the financial order -0,05 0,7 0,02 
Federal decree on recovering money owed to the federal 
government 
-0,08 0,69 0,03 
Federal decree on measures for preserving social insurance  0,35 0,52 0,4 
Federal decree on special excise taxes 0,35 0,48 0,46 
Popular initiative on the reduction of alcohol problems 0,55 0,41 0,46 
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Popular initiative on the reduction of tobacco problems 0,53 0,33 0,51 
Federal decree on roadbuilding -0,04 0,88 0,14 
Federal decree on continuing existing truck tolls -0,1 0,87 0,24 
Federal decree on varying tolls based on engine power or 
mileage 
-0,13 0,8 0,35 
Popular initiative for the protection of the alpine region from 
traffic 
-0,31 0,75 0,08 
Amendment to the aeronautical law 0,6 -0,13 -0,01 
Federal decree on the constitutional article on the promotion 
of culture 
0,72 0,23 -0,42 
Federal decree on facilitated naturalization for foreign youth 0,87 0,02 -0,05 
Federal law on Swiss troops in peacekeeping operations 0,89 -0,01 -0,02 
Federal decree on abolishing price reductions on breadstuffs 0,57 0,48 0,33 
Amendments to the Swiss Penal Code and the Military Penal 
Code 
0,73 0,37 0 
Federal law on health insurance -0,3 0,34 0,56 
Popular initiative for a healthy health insurance 0,29 0,04 -0,72 
Federal law on foreigners 0,57 -0,09 -0,58 
Federal decree on the popular initiative for an 
environmentally sound and efficient peasant farming (counter-
proposal) 
0,44 -0,07 0,44 
Federal decree on dairy farming 0,34 -0,67 -0,03 
Amendment to the farming law 0,32 -0,69 0,01 
Federal decree on spending 0,33 -0,7 0,07 
Amendment to the federal law on aged and bereaved 
insurance 
0,18 0,26 -0,73 
Popular initiative to extend aged and bereaved and invalidity 
insurance 
0,14 0,1 0,8 
Amendment to the federal law on purchasing land through 
agents abroad 
0,76 -0,27 -0,23 
Amendment to the constitutional article on languages 0,36 0,46 0,33 
Federal decree on whether municipality of Vellerat (then part 
of the canton of Bern) should become part of the canton of 
Jura 
0,08 0,46 0,35 
Federal decree on abolishing the cantons' responsibilities for 
providing army equipment 
0,65 0,33 0,26 
Federal decree on abolishing the federal requirement to 
purchase distilling equipment 
0,47 0,12 0,06 
Federal decree on abolishing federal financing of parking 
areas at rail stations 
0,58 0,04 -0,27 
Federal decree on the popular initiative "peasants and 
consumers-for a nature-oriented farming" (counter-proposal) 
0,14 0,73 0,04 
Federal law on governmental and administrative organization 0,8 -0,02 -0,3 
Popular initiative against illegal immigration 0,14 0,23 0,64 
Amendment to the federal law on labor in trade and industry -0,76 0,17 0,23 
Popular initiative "EU accession talks in front of the people" 0,4 0,43 0,38 
Popular initiative for a ban on arms exports 0,42 0,22 -0,57 
Federal decree on ending the federal monopoly on producing 
and selling gunpowder 
-0,6 0,12 -0,17 
Federal decree on financing unemployment insurance -0,31 0,26 0,71 
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Popular initiative "youth without drugs" -0,31 -0,45 -0,09 
Federal decree on a balanced budget -0,53 0,6 0,17 
Popular initiative for the protection of life and environment 
against genetic engineering 
0 0,38 -0,51 
Popular initiative "Switzerland without secret police" 0,03 0,25 0,77 
Federal law on truck tolls based on engine size -0,16 0,75 -0,2 
Popular initiative for well-priced foodstuffs and ecological 
farms 
0,36 0,71 -0,14 
Popular initiative "10th revision of the Aged and Bereaved 
Insurance without raising the retirement age" 
0,29 0,02 -0,84 
Federal decree on building and financing public transport 
infrastructure 
-0,2 0,62 0,15 
Federal decree for a temporary article in the Swiss Federal 
Constitution on grain 
0,15 0,52 0,51 
Popular initiative for a prudential drug policy 0,59 0,47 0,02 
Amendment to the federal law on labor in trade and industry 0,41 0,46 -0,32 
Federal decree on changes to the eligibility for membership of 
the Federal Council 
0,3 0,4 0,55 
Federal decree on constitutional regulations on organ 
transplantation 
0,65 0,01 0,05 
Popular initiative "house ownership for everyone" -0,09 -0,12 0,28 
Amendment to the federal law on spatial planning 0,39 -0,45 -0,11 
Federal decree on a new Swiss Federal Constitution 0,82 -0,02 -0,31 
Federal law on asylum 0,27 0,7 0,23 
Federal decree on asylum and foreigners -0,15 0,47 0,62 
Federal decree on the medical prescription of heroin -0,05 0,46 0,61 
Federal law on disability 0,37 -0,13 0,11 
Federal law on maternity insurance 0,7 -0,23 -0,57 
Federal decree on reforming the judiciary 0,11 0,76 -0,04 
Popular initiative for speeding up direct democracy -0,56 0,56 0,04 
Popular initiative for a just representation of women in federal 
authorities 
0,64 0,36 0,2 
Popular initiative for the protection of men against 
manipulations in procreation technology 
-0,2 0,19 -0,04 
Popular initiative on halving motorized road traffic 0,49 0,11 -0,47 
Federal decree authorizing sectoral agreements between 
Switzerland and the European Union 
0,81 -0,15 -0,01 
Popular initiative on promoting solar energy 0,14 0,73 0,08 
Federal decree on the popular initiative on promoting solar 
energy (counter-proposal) 
0,16 0,6 -0,17 
Federal decree on the popular initiative on energy efficiency 
(counter-proposal) 
0,35 0,5 -0,06 
Popular initiative for regulating immigration -0,09 0,29 -0,54 
Popular initiative "more rights for people thanks to 
referendums with counter-proposals" 
-0,75 0,2 0,18 
Popular initiative against raising the female retirement age 0 0,28 0,8 
Popular initiative for a flexible retirement age for men and 
women from 62 years on 
-0,22 0,04 -0,5 
Popular initiative on economizing on military and defense-for 
more peace and seminal jobs 
0,59 -0,07 -0,65 
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Popular initiative for lower hospital expenses 0,42 -0,14 -0,77 
Federal law on federal employees 0,37 -0,18 -0,78 
 
Table A.3: Factor scores for the period 2001-2010 
Vote Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Popular initiative on joining the European Union -0,28 -0,2 0,7 
Popular initiative on lowering medicine prices 0,23 0,14 0,63 
Popular initiative on lowering the urban speed limit to 30 
km/h 
0,72 0,52 -0,13 
Amendment to the federal law on the Swiss army I 0,67 -0,16 0,32 
Amendment to the federal law on the Swiss army II 0,14 -0,06 0,3 
Federal decree on abolishing the requirement for a permit to 
establish a diocese 
0,73 -0,15 0,27 
Federal decree on expenditure 0,07 0,42 0,53 
Popular initiative for an assured Aged and Bereaved insurance 
- tax on energy instead of work 
0,06 0,54 0,16 
Popular initiative for an authentic security policy and a 
Switzerland without army 
0,17 -0,64 0,13 
Popular initiative "Solidarity creates security: for a voluntary 
civilian peace service" 
0,4 0,7 0,09 
Popular initiative for a capital gains tax 0,4 0,76 0,08 
Popular initiative on joining the United Nations 0,87 0,22 0,15 
Popular initiative to reduce working hours 0,31 0,79 0,06 
Amendment to the penal code regarding abortion 0,67 0,17 0,15 
Popular initiative for mother and child -0,6 -0,03 -0,21 
Popular initiative on adding surplus gold reserves to the 
country's pension fund 
-0,06 -0,54 0,46 
Federal decree on the popular initiative on adding surplus gold 
reserves to the country's pension fund (counter-proposal) 
0,45 0,27 0,27 
Federal law on the electricity market -0,64 -0,11 -0,03 
Popular initiative against misuse of asylum rights 0,14 -0,7 0,15 
Federal law on compulsory unemployment insurance and 
compensation for insolvencies 
-0,65 -0,43 0,04 
Federal decree on reforming the referendum process 0,24 -0,11 0,37 
Federal decree on changing the cantonal contribution to 
financing hospital medication 
0,44 0,05 0,03 
Federal law on the Swiss army 0 0,23 0,6 
Federal law on civil defense 0,2 0,65 0,36 
Popular initiative "yes to fair rents" 0,1 0,76 0,22 
Popular initiative for one Sunday a season free from motor 
vehicles-a test for four years 
0,18 0,85 0,13 
Popular initiative "health has to be affordable" 0,7 0,1 0,12 
Popular rights for equal rights for the disabled 0,21 0,83 0,06 
Popular initiative "electricity without nuclear power" 0,73 0,07 0,05 
Popular initiative for prolonging the ban on new nuclear 
power stations 
0,08 0,88 0 
Popular initiative for a sufficient provision of vocational 
education 
0,12 0,85 -0,03 
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Federal decree on the popular initiative for safe and efficient 
motorways (counter-proposal) 
-0,37 -0,61 0,42 
Amendment to the Obligations law -0,57 0,1 -0,03 
Popular initiative "life-long custody for non-curable, 
extremely dangerous sexual and violent criminals" 
0,16 -0,22 -0,12 
Amendment to the federal law on Aged and Bereaved 
insurance 
0,57 -0,06 0,36 
Federal decree on financing the Aged and Bereaved insurance 0,23 -0,72 0,23 
Federal law that would affect taxation for married couples, 
families, private housing and stamp duty 
0,25 -0,54 0,18 
Federal decree on ordinary and facilitated naturalization (2nd 
generation) 
0,8 0,48 -0,18 
Federal decree on ordinary and facilitated naturalization (3rd 
generation) 
0,79 0,48 -0,22 
Popular initiative "postal services for all" 0,68 0,61 -0,23 
Federal law on compensating members of the armed forces for 
loss of earnings 
-0,08 0,75 -0,28 
Federal decree on rebalancing the financial duties of the 
Federation and the Cantons 
0,64 -0,02 0,09 
Federal decree on the constitutional reordering of the budget 0,26 -0,13 0,01 
Federal law on stem cell research 0,71 0,19 -0,07 
Federal decree on Switzerland joining the Schengen Area 0,65 -0,07 0,5 
Federal decree on whether registered partnerships for same-
sex couples should be introduced 
0,91 0,24 0,03 
Federal decree on extending the agreement on free movement 
of people to new members of the European Union 
0,91 0,08 0,07 
Federal decree on the popular initiative for food from an 
agriculture free of genetic modification (counter-proposal) 
0,42 -0,39 0,49 
Federal labor law related to the opening times of shops in 
public transport hubs 
-0,11 0,55 -0,25 
Amendment to the constitutional article on education 0,6 -0,06 -0,06 
Popular initiative on diverting profits from the Swiss National 
Bank into the national pension fund 
-0,52 -0,68 0,24 
Federal law on foreigners -0,53 -0,69 0,16 
Amendments to the federal law on asylum -0,13 0,74 0,14 
Federal law on assistance to Poland and other poorer EU 
countries 
0,86 0,15 0,14 
Amendment to the family allowances law 0,3 0,58 0,01 
Popular initiative for a social unified health insurance 0,26 0,83 -0,2 
Amendment to the disability insurance law -0,13 -0,8 0,09 
Popular initiative against fighter aircraft noise in tourism areas 0,35 0,61 0 
Federal law on the corporate tax reform 0 -0,6 -0,11 
Popular initiative for democratic naturalization -0,4 -0,65 0,41 
Popular initiative against publicly funded information 
campaigns by the government 
-0,73 -0,52 0,24 
Amendment to the constitutional article on health insurance -0,72 -0,37 0,21 
Popular initiative for the elimination of the statute of 
limitations with respect to pornographic crimes against 
children 
-0,15 0,01 0,73 
Popular initiative for a flexible retirement age 0,2 -0,12 0,68 
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Popular initiative  for the restriction of the right of 
associations to appeal against building projects 
-0,6 0 0,28 
Popular initiative for a sensible cannabis policy with effective 
protection of the youth 
-0,01 0,85 -0,05 
Amendment to the federal law on narcotics -0,13 -0,39 -0,19 
Federal decree on approving the renewal of the EU-
Switzerland bilateral agreement on free mobility 
0,87 0,09 -0,04 
Constitutional article "Future with complementary medicine" 0,47 -0,22 0,24 
Federal decree on the introduction of biometric passports 0,5 0,47 -0,25 
Federal decree on a limited increase of the value added tax to 
continue financing the disability insurance 
0,75 -0,01 0,05 
Federal decree on accepting the decision not to introduce the 
generic popular initiative 
0,7 0,46 0,02 
Federal decree on aviation fuel taxation 0,64 -0,23 0,24 
Popular initiative "ban on exporting war supplies" 0,41 0,64 0,08 
Popular initiative against the construction of minarets -0,81 -0,29 0,01 
Amendment to the constitutional article on research on 
humans 
0,01 0,03 0,76 
Popular initiative on providing enhanced legal protection for 
animals 
0,05 -0,64 0,07 
Amendment to the federal law on Aged and Bereaved 
insurance 
0,79 0,21 -0,01 
Amendment to the federal law on unemployment benefits -0,06 -0,83 0,17 
Popular initiative for the deportation of foreign criminals 0,53 0 0,25 
Federal decree on the popular initiative for the deportation of 
foreign criminals (counter-proposal) 
0,1 0,68 0,14 
Popular initiative for fair taxes -0,82 -0,32 0,04 
 
Table A.4: Factor scores for the period 2011-2017 
Vote Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Popular initiative for the protection against gun violence 0,49 0,67 0,06 
Popular initiative "an end to the limitless construction of 
second homes" 
0,31 0,04 0,57 
Popular initiative for tax-supported building society savings to 
buy living space for self-use and to finance energy saving and 
environmental measures 
0,84 0,07 -0,01 
Popular initiative "six weeks of vacation for everyone" 0,4 0,53 -0,17 
Federal decree on using the state earnings from gambling for 
the public interest 
0,69 0,27 -0,3 
Federal law on the fixed book price agreement 0,44 -0,02 -0,62 
Popular initiative on assistance with savings for home buyers -0,55 -0,06 0,53 
Popular initiative on reinforcing popular rights in foreign 
policy 
-0,17 -0,71 0 
Amendment to the federal law on healthcare 0,26 0,04 -0,53 
Federal decree on the popular initiative on promoting music 
lessons for youth (counter-proposal) 
-0,21 -0,29 0,09 
Popular initiative on secure housing in old age 0,43 0,41 0,07 
Popular initiative on a smoking ban 0,5 0,2 -0,07 
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Amendment to the federal law on animal diseases 0,42 0,65 -0,33 
Federal decree on family policy -0,03 0,15 0,67 
Popular initiative against rip-off salaries 0,38 -0,35 0,53 
Amendment to the federal law on spatial planning 0,75 0,49 -0,24 
Popular initiative on the direct election of the Federal Council -0,73 -0,21 0,14 
Urgent modification of the federal law on asylum -0,09 -0,66 -0,03 
Popular initiative on the abolition of compulsory military 
service 
0,76 0,43 0 
Amendment to the federal law on epidemics -0,19 0,34 -0,17 
Amendment to the federal law on labor in trade and industry 0,42 0,6 -0,39 
Popular initiative on fair wages -0,25 0,51 0,21 
Popular initiative on tax credits for stay-at-home parents 0,74 -0,28 0,2 
Amendment to the federal law on road taxation -0,32 -0,75 0,06 
Federal decree on the popular initiative on financing and 
developing the railway infrastructure (counter-proposal) 
-0,59 -0,6 0,29 
Popular initiative on abortion -0,31 -0,87 0,09 
Popular initiative against mass immigration 0,46 0,64 -0,21 
Federal decree on the popular initiative on primary health care 
(counter-proposal) 
0,86 0,06 0,18 
Popular initiative on a lifetime ban on convicted pedophiles 
working with children 
-0,77 -0,42 0,12 
Popular initiative on minimum wages 0,41 0,47 0,04 
Federal law on the procurement of the JAS 39 Gripen fighter 
aircraft 
0,49 -0,48 -0,55 
Popular initiative on the value added tax for the hospitality 
industry 
0,86 0,21 -0,1 
Popular initiative for a unified health insurance fund 0,21 -0,44 -0,3 
Popular initiative for the abolition of the flat tax 0,03 -0,23 0,8 
Popular initiative "Stop overpopulation (ECOPOP)" -0,16 -0,81 0,25 
Popular initiative on gold reserves -0,08 -0,83 0,08 
Popular initiative for the exemption of family allowances 
from income tax 
0,03 0,17 0,51 
Popular initiative on a non-renewable energy tax 0,44 -0,18 -0,32 
Federal decree on the constitutional article on reproductive 
medicine 
0,45 -0,02 0,68 
Popular initiative on scholarships 0,82 0,28 -0,01 
Popular initiative on inheritance taxes 0,51 0,61 -0,1 
Amendment to the federal law on radio and television 0,51 0,62 -0,35 
Popular initiative for the couple and the family - No to the 
penalty of marriage 
0,71 -0,08 0,38 
Popular initiative for the actual deportation of foreign 
criminals (implementation initiative) 
-0,61 -0,4 0,06 
Popular initiative "No speculation on food" -0,21 -0,91 -0,1 
Amendment to the federal law on road transit in the Alpine 
region 
0,03 -0,6 -0,22 
Popular initiative for the public service 0,31 -0,52 0,35 
Popular initiative for a basic income 0,77 0,13 0,29 
Popular initiative for fair transport financing 0,22 0,82 0,15 
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Amendment to the federal law on medically assisted 
reproduction 
-0,19 -0,71 0,01 
Amendments to the federal law on asylum 0,47 0,61 -0,39 
Popular initiative for a green economy 0,79 0,37 0,15 
Popular initiative on the retirement system 0,86 0,04 0,01 
Federal law on intelligence -0,03 0,36 -0,43 
Popular initiative for the programmed phase-out of nuclear 
energy 
0,75 0,4 0,07 
Federal decree on the simplified naturalization of third-
generation immigrants 
0,51 0,76 -0,09 
Federal decree on establishing a fund for national roads and 
urban traffic 
-0,02 0,49 -0,52 
Federal law on the corporate tax reform -0,03 0,26 -0,74 
Federal law on energy 0,52 0,65 -0,2 
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Appendix 3.B – Results of Dunn’s tests 
“Left-Right” dimension 
Table B.1: Results of Dunn’s tests on median income on the “Left-Right” dimension 
Median income (1981-1990)  
 
 
Left 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-3.84 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Right 
 
2.36 
p = 0.009 
6.97 
p < 0.001 
Median “Left” = 32’500 
Median “Not Significant” = 34’000 
Median “Right” = 32’250 
 
 
Median income (1991-2000)  
 
 
Left 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-10.21 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Right 
 
-9.69 
p < 0.001 
-1.37 
p = 0.09 
Median “Left” = 44’350 
Median “Not Significant” = 48’050 
Median “Right” = 48’500 
Median income (2001-2010)  
 
 
Left 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-0.87 
p = 0.57 
 
 
 
 
Right 
 
-0.75 
p = 0.34 
-0.02 
p = 0.49 
Median “Left” = 54’967 
Median “Not Significant” = 56’000 
Median “Right” = 55’925 
Median income (2011-2017)  
 
 
Left 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
4.24 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Right 
 
7.91 
p < 0.001 
5.23 
p < 0.001 
Median “Left” = 61’800 
Median “Not Significant” = 59’550 
Median “Right” = 56’600 
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Table B.2: Results of Dunn’s tests on the Gini coefficient of the income distribution on the “Left-
Right” dimension 
Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
(1981-1990)  
 
 
Left 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
1.96 
p = 0.02 
 
 
 
 
Right 
 
7.70 
p < 0.001 
7.91 
p < 0.001 
Median “Left” = 0.317 
Median “Not Significant” = 0.308 
Median “Right” = 0.290 
Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
(1991-2000)  
 
 
Left 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
4.85 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Right 
 
3.09 
p = 0.002 
-1.14 
p = 0.13 
Median “Left” = 0.329 
Median “Not Significant” = 0.316 
Median “Right” = 0.318 
Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
(2001-2010)  
 
 
Left 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
3.34 
p = 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Right 
 
2.39 
p = 0.01 
-0.49 
p = 0.31 
Median “Left” = 0.316 
Median “Not Significant” = 0.310 
Median “Right” = 0.310 
Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
(2011-2017)  
 
 
Left 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
8.56 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Right 
 
10.15 
p < 0.001 
3.64 
p < 0.001 
Median “Left” = 0.360 
Median “Not Significant” = 0.336 
Median “Right” = 0.328 
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“Liberal-Conservative” dimension 
Table B.3: Results of Dunn’s tests on median income on the “Liberal-Conservative” dimension 
Median income (1981-1990)  
 
 
Conservative 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-9.29 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
-9.39 
p < 0.001 
2.96 
p = 0.002 
Median “Conservative” = 30’775 
Median “Not Significant” = 33’600 
Median “Liberal” = 34’850 
 
 
Median income (1991-2000)  
 
 
Conservative 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-4.65 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
-9.66 
p < 0.001 
7.55 
p < 0.001 
Median “Conservative” = 45’650 
Median “Not Significant” = 47’125 
Median “Liberal” = 50’050 
Median income (2001-2010)  
 
 
Conservative 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-9.58 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
-18.11 
p < 0.001 
13.51 
p < 0.001 
Median “Conservative” = 52’200 
Median “Not Significant” = 55’800 
Median “Liberal” = 62’500 
Median income (2011-2017)  
 
 
Conservative 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-9.77 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
-17.59 
p < 0.001 
12.73 
p < 0.001 
Median “Conservative” = 54’200 
Median “Not Significant” = 59’150 
Median “Liberal” = 68’400 
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Table B.4: Results of Dunn’s tests on the Gini coefficient of the income distribution on the “Liberal-
Conservative” dimension 
Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
(1981-1990)  
 
 
Conservative 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-7.20 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
-12.48 
p < 0.001 
9.17 
p < 0.001 
Median “Conservative” = 0.279 
Median “Not Significant” = 0.304 
Median “Liberal” = 0.335 
 
 
Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
(1991-2000)  
 
 
Conservative 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-9.45 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
-11.55 
p < 0.001 
5.03 
p < 0.001 
Median “Conservative” = 0.304 
Median “Not Significant” = 0.322 
Median “Liberal” = 0.338 
Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
(2001-2010)  
 
 
Conservative 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-7.55 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
-10.93 
p < 0.001 
6.36 
p < 0.001 
Median “Conservative” = 0.297 
Median “Not Significant” = 0.311 
Median “Liberal” = 0.331 
Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
(2011-2017)  
 
 
Conservative 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-8.27 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Liberal 
 
-14.19 
p < 0.001 
9.89 
p < 0.001 
Median “Conservative” = 0.317 
Median “Not Significant” = 0.337 
Median “Liberal” = 0.371 
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“Ecological-Technocratic” dimension 
Table B.5: Results of Dunn’s tests on median income on the “Ecological-Technocratic” dimension 
Median income (1981-1990)  
 
 
Ecological 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
5.57 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Technocratic 
 
3.59 
p < 0.001 
-1.21 
p = 0.11 
Median “Ecological” = 34’700 
Median “Not Significant” = 33’050 
Median “Technocratic” = 33’117 
Median income (1991-2000)  
 
 
Ecological 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
0.71 
p = 0.24 
 
 
 
 
Technocratic 
 
3.34 
p < 0.001 
3.37 
p = 0.001 
Median “Ecological” = 48’000 
Median “Not Significant” = 47’400 
Median “Technocratic” = 45’938 
Median income (2001-2010)  
 
 
Ecological 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
3.52 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Technocratic 
 
7.52 
p < 0.001 
5.90 
p < 0.001 
Median “Ecological” = 58’000 
Median “Not Significant” = 55’925 
Median “Technocratic” = 53’150 
 
 
Median income (2011-2017)  
 
 
Ecological 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-2.01 
p = 0.03 
 
 
 
 
Technocratic 
 
-2.64 
p = 0.01 
-1.20 
p = 0.12 
Median “Ecological” = 58’400 
Median “Not Significant” = 59’400 
Median “Technocratic” = 60’300 
 
 
104 
Table B.6: Results of Dunn’s tests on the Gini coefficient of the income distribution on the 
“Ecological-Technocratic” dimension 
Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
(1981-1990)  
 
 
Ecological 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
3.97 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Technocratic 
 
-0.25 
p = 0.40 
-4.26 
p < 0.001 
Median “Ecological” = 0.311 
Median “Not Significant” = 0.302 
Median “Technocratic” = 0.315 
 
 
Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
(1991-2000)  
 
 
Ecological 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
11.34 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Technocratic 
 
6.87 
p < 0.001 
-2.46 
p = 0.007 
Median “Ecological” = 0.343 
Median “Not Significant” = 0.313 
Median “Technocratic” = 0.318 
Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
(2001-2010)  
 
 
Ecological 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
5.85 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Technocratic 
 
4.90 
p < 0.001 
0.43 
p = 0.33 
Median “Ecological” = 0.323 
Median “Not Significant” = 0.308 
Median “Technocratic” = 0.307 
Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
(2011-2017)  
 
 
Ecological 
Not 
Significant 
Not 
Significant 
-4.40 
p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Technocratic 
 
-13.02 
p < 0.001 
-11.74 
p < 0.001 
Median “Ecological” = 0.327 
Median “Not Significant” = 0.333 
Median “Technocratic” = 0.373 
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4. Conclusions 
As the world becomes more and more globalized, by connecting national and local economies 
and creating a single world economy, the relevance of geographical proximity increases, despite some 
having claimed that spatial distances would no longer represent an obstacle. In fact, in the last decades 
there has been an increase in the urbanization process, in which people and economic activities are 
more and more concentrated in cities, and spatial proximity has become even more important in 
processes of knowledge spillovers and agglomeration externalities. This is due to the fact that 
traditional globalization, characterized by trade relationships over long distances and involving 
countries producing different types of goods, has evolved into modern globalization, characterized 
by trade relationships between neighboring countries with similar economic systems. The general 
perception about globalization is that it is based on the competition over the costs of inputs. 
Nevertheless, although this was true for traditional globalization, modern globalization is based on 
adding value into the production process, which crucially depends on knowledge exchange, especially 
through face-to-face interactions. As the importance of knowledge increases, so does the need for 
concentration, because of productivity gains due to clustering, proximity and economies of scale. 
However, although the evidence demonstrating the growing importance of geographical proximity 
keeps increasing, various actors in the society argue that this is not true and support a view in which 
the world is flat and distances are no longer important. Narratives built on these incorrect arguments 
might have significant consequences and make it difficult to build serious debate within a society. 
This thesis proposes three essays on the importance of geographical concentrations and aims 
at enriching the current discussion on the relevance of spatial proximity by providing empirical 
evidences demonstrating that geographical distance still matters in various and specific contexts. In 
particular, this thesis deals with topics regarding firm’s credit accessibility, the interaction between 
culture and agglomeration externalities, and the interaction between political ideologies and 
economic welfare. 
In the first chapter, the analyses empirically verifies whether agglomeration spillovers affect 
a particular indicator of firm performance, namely firm solvency, which, in turn, determines firm’s 
ability to borrow. While most of the past analyses on agglomeration economies focus on their effects 
on self-reported indicators of firm performance, such as employment growth or productivity, this 
study offers an analysis on these effects on firm solvency, which is computed from an external and 
standardized perspective. Moreover, this variable is accessible to everyone and helps financial 
markets to reduce asymmetries in information faced when deciding whether to grant credits to firms. 
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The results show that agglomeration mechanisms shape firm’s credit accessibility, along with 
the characteristics of the firm itself and geographical information. As highlighted by the economic 
literature, this has in turn implications on firm’s investment possibility and therefore on their ability 
to strengthen their productivity. Additionally, by simultaneously analyzing firm- and regional-level 
data and applying spatial multilevel techniques, the results indicate that the geography of 
agglomeration mechanisms not only is important per se, but it also differently shapes the transmission 
mechanism of other effects. 
 The second chapter empirically examines whether the spatial scale of different types of 
agglomeration spillovers shape and/or are shaped by cultural and soft institutional discontinuities, as 
reflected by linguistic differences between localities. Traditional analyses generally do not include 
issues of culture, thereby neglecting whether and how various cultural environments may impact on 
the externalities arising from the concentration of firms. This study contributes to the literature by 
investigating whether the existence of language barriers, expressing underlying cultural differences, 
has an impact on the geographical extension of the benefits that firms might gain from being located 
near to other business activities. 
The findings of this study demonstrate that the economic geography of agglomeration 
spillovers is mediated and altered by linguistic discontinuities and this has not been modelled nor 
considered before. More specifically, the results indicate that specialization externalities are enhanced 
when firms are located close to municipalities with the same language, whereas competition and 
diversity externalities are reinforced when firms are located close to municipalities with different 
languages. These findings support other scholars, who argue that culture influences also other aspects 
of economic geography. 
Finally, the third chapter proposes a new definition of spatial cohesion, based on the 
geographical concentration of political ideologies, which represents a new way to capture social 
interactions. Moreover, this study investigates whether there is any spatial concentration of political 
ideologies and verifies whether these concentrations are correlated with income and income 
inequality. The underlying hypothesis is that partisan-sorting forces and income-sorting processes are 
interrelated phenomena leading to the clustering of people having similar political ideologies and 
analogous levels of income. 
The results of this study indicate the existence of spatial concentrations of Swiss 
municipalities sharing the same political ideology, showing that, interestingly, this type of social 
interactions extends beyond municipal borders. Additionally, this research finds significant 
differences in the level of income and income inequality of Swiss municipalities, depending on their 
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belonging to a political ideology cluster. This result contributes and further supports the findings and 
claims of other scholars, according to which economic geography is particularly important in 
understanding how people vote. 
In general, the findings of the analyses contained in this thesis contribute to the current 
discussion on the importance of geographical proximity, by empirically demonstrating that distance 
still represents an obstacle for various processes in economics, against the view that the world has 
become “flat”. These results further support the findings and claims of other scholars, arguing that, 
along with the rise of globalization processes, spatial proximity has become even more important. 
More specifically, the findings of this thesis shed light on unexplored aspects of agglomeration 
processes and demonstrate the importance of geographical proximity in the cases of firm’s credit 
accessibility, the interaction between agglomeration externalities and language barriers, expressing 
underlying cultural differences, and the interaction between political ideologies and economic 
welfare. Hence, the results of this thesis indicate that clustering forces involving people and firms 
shape and are shaped by the working of social aspects like trust, culture and political ideologies. 
These findings are particularly interesting because they emerge from the Swiss context, a 
small open economy in which globalization processes have always had great impacts and where 
distances are notably small. It seems therefore logical to assume that if spatial proximity matters on 
a small scale, it also does on a large one. In fact, this hypothesis is supported and demonstrated by an 
increasing number of studies. Hence, spatial proximity still matters. 
